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ORGANIZED CRIME: CHALLENGE TO THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM
Part 11-The Legal Weapons: Their Actual and Potential Usefulness in Law Enforcement
EARL JOHNSON, JR.
Mr. Johnson is a Special Attorney in the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section of the United
States Department of Justice.* After receiving his J.D. degree from the University of Chicago Law
School in 1960, Mr. Johnson became a Ford Foundation Fellow in Criminal Law at the Northwestern
University School of Law, where he received his LL.M. degree in 1961.
This article is the second of three installments, the first of which appeared in Volume 53, Number 4
of the Journal, at page 399. This series of articles is based upon a thesis which the author prepared
while a graduate student at the Northwestern University School of Law.
Mr. Johnson's first installment contained an assessment of the effects of organized crime on Ameri-
can society and an analysis of the factors which have made organized crime difficult to suppress
through traditional methods of law enforcement. The second installment summarizes the various
legal countermeasures available to an honest prosecutor-particularly a local prosecutor-in com-
bating organized crime. These measures involve techniques designed to weaken criminal organiza-
tions through convicting their leaders, reducing their profits, and denying them access to services
and facilities necessary to their illegal enterprises. The third installment will be a survey of the legal
countermeasures available to minimize the effects of political corruption upon the prosecutive effort
against organized crime. This survey will encompass means for substituting another prosecutive
agency where the local prosecutor is corrupt or ineffectual, sanctions to discourage a corrupt official
from improper acts, methods of minimizihg the effects of improper acts when they do occur, and
techniques to maximize the effect of an honest official where others in the law enforcement machinery
appear to be under the control of organized crime.-EDIToR.
It would be unrealistic to suggest that organized
crime can be overcome merely by new applications
of old laws or by enacting some new ones. Orga-
nized crime is not merely a legal problem. It is a
social-political-economic-legal problem. Various
aspects of the problem admit in varying degrees to
a legal solution. There are certain aspects for which
no change in the lawcould possibly be of assistance.
Certainly one cannot legislate public arousal. On
the other hand, just as certainly, there are pro-
cedural and substantive legal techniques which can
minimize the effects of the size, wealth, and system-
atic methods of criminal organizations and the
political corruption which they have been able to
engender.
In the two remaining installments of this article,
an attempt will be made to survey a wide spectrum
of possible legal approaches to the problem of
organized crime. Two broad categories of legal ap-
* The views expressed in this article are the views
of the author and are not meant to reflect those of the
United States Department of Justice or the Organized
Crime and Racketeering Section of that Department.
proaches are to be discussed. In this installment are
catalogued the legal weapons available to an es-
sentially honest and dedicated law enforcement
body in combatting organized crime. These various
legal weapons embody three distinct approaches to
the containment of organized crime: the conviction
of organization leaders; the curtailment of organi-
zation profits; and the denial of facilities necessary
to organization enterprises.
The final installment of the article, to appear in
a subsequent issue of the Journal, will be concerned
with the problem of political corruption. In that
installment, a second broad category of legal ap-
proaches will be discussed, approaches which may
be utilized to minimize the rotting effects of cor-
ruption on the law enforcement effort against
organized crime.
I. CONVIcTING "MANAGEMENT-LEVEL" MEMBERS
OF A CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION
In order to operate its far flung enterprises, any
criminal organization must commit a variety of
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crimes. The more frequent though less serious in-
fractions are those which continuously occur be-
cause the normal operation of an organization's
businesses is illegal. For instance, every moment
that an organization gambling house is open, it is
violating several state laws and city ordinances.
But the pattern of organized crime reveals this
is not the full extent of an organization's criminal
activities. A disturbing number of subsidiary
crimes--often crimes of violence---are also part of
the business techniques employed by organized
crime. Extortion, assault, arson, and murder are
accepted methods for acquiring and perpetuating
monopolies in the lines of endeavor the organiza-
tion has chosen to enter. Despite the frequency and
seriousness of the crimes committed by the organi-
zation, the management-level members of the
organization, for reasons explored in the first in-
stallment of this article, Tm are extremely well in-
sulated and exceedingly difficult to convict for the
crimes committed by the organization. There are
two logical alternative approaches to this problem.
One is to develop legal techniques which will ease
the conviction of members for the crimes com-
mitted by an organization. The other is to seek to
convict these men for their personal crimes un-
related to the organization's criminal activities.
Both approaches have been employed with infre-
quent, though sometimes dramatic success.
A. Convicting Management-Level Members for the
Criminal Activities of a Criminal Organization
To effectively prosecute a crime overlord for
the criminal acts committed by the criminal syndi-
cate which he directs requires two essential steps.
First, a prosecutive theory must be available which
will render his particular role in the activity a
crime. Inasmuch as he does not commit that crimi-
nal act himself, his liability, if any, must be founded
upon his indirect, often far-removed, but crucial
connection with organization activities. Second,
evidence must be developed which will establish
that the organization leader in fact had the requi-
site connection with the criminal act of which law
enforcement officers have knowledge.
1. Theories Rendering Criminal the Connection of
Management-Level Organization Members
with Organization Activities
The prosecutive theory most often employed in
attempts to connect management-level organiza-
'3 The factors which render organization leaders
virtually immune from prosecution for organization
activities are summarized in Part I of this series, 53
J. Cans. L., C. & P. S. 399, at 416-18 (1962).
tion members to the criminal acts committed by a
criminal organization is conspiracy. 135 For men
whose function is to plan and direct rather than
perpetrate criminal acts this is the most feasible
technique to employ. The conspiracy theory has
much to recommend it as a technique for ensnaring
the well-insulated leadership of organized crime.
The fundamental essence of a conspiracy obviates
the necessity of establishing that the organization
leader himself committed a physical act amounting
to a crime or that he even committed an overt act
in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy. It is
sufficient if he can be shown to have been a party
to the conspiratorial agreement.136 Thus, the back-
stage role which a leading racketeer ordinarily
plays in organization criminal activities does not
immunize him from criminal liability. Moreover,
once he is shown to be a member of the conspiracy,
all out-of-court statements of his co-conspirators
which are made in furtherance of the conspiracy
are admissible against an organization leader.m
Accordingly, statements of other organization
members to third parties can be used to convict its
leading figures.
In some jurisdictions, conspiracy has an en-
hanced potential as a theory for convicting top
hoodlums because of a lenient attitude toward the
degree of connection required between the criminal
act and the prime object of the conspiracy. In these
jurisdictions, a participant in a conspiracy is re-
sponsible for all crimes committed by his co-con-
spirators in furtherance of the conspiracy, regard-
less of whether or not it can be established that he
knew of the acts or participated in these crimes.m
"I The essential elements of. a conspiracy charge
are: (1) an agreement between two or more persons
with the (2) intent to commit an (3) anti-social act or
acts (some jurisdictions require that it be an act or
acts prohibited by the criminal law) and accompanied
by (4) the commission of some overt act in furtherance
of the agreement (this latter element is not required
in all jurisdictions). For a recent exhaustive survey of
the law of conspiracy, consult Comment, Develop-
ments in the Law: Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HAIv. L.
R1v. 920 (1958-1959). See also, Arens, Conspiracy
Revisited, 3 BUFFALO L. RPv. 242 (1954), and Note,
The Conspiracy Dilemma: Prosecution of Group Crine
or Protection of Individual Defendants, 62 Hanv. L.
REv. 276 (1948), both of which consider the conspiracy
device as it has developed in response to the challenge
of organized crime.
136 "Overt acts proved against one or more of the
[co-conspirators] may be looked to as against all of
them.... " State v. Carbone, 10 N.J. 329, 91 A.2d
571 (1952).
tm United States v. Levi, 276 F.2d 604 (2d Cir.
1960), cert. den. 363 U.S. 812; State v. Carbone, supra
note 136.
138 "[So long as the partnership in crime contin-
ues, the partners act for each other in carrying it fore-
[Vol. 54
19631 ORGANIZED CRIME: CHALLENGE TO THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM
Thus, if it can be proved that a criminal organiza-
tion exists and that one of its members in further-
ance of its overall objectives committed a given
criminal act, the organization leadership will be
subject to prosecution under a conspiracy charge.
This obviates the difficult problem of proving what
occurs within the inner sanctum of a criminal or-
ganizations' planning council in order to establish
the criminal responsibility of organization leaders.
In the great majority of jurisdictions, the principal
limitation on this doctrine of vicarious criminal
liability is the requirement that the act for which a
conspirator is held responsible be at least reason-
ably forseeable to him as a potential result of the
concerted effort toward the group's objectives. 9
One of the chief limitations upon conspiracy as
an effective theory for linking an organization
leadership to its illegal activities is that in most
jurisdictions the penalty exacted for conspiring to
engage in given criminal conduct cannot be greater
than that which could be imposed upon an indi-
vidual for the substantive act.140 Since most of the
crimes associated with the normal business oper-
ations of an organization, particularly gambling
and shylocking, carry nominal criminal penalties,
the time and expense required to prepare an
elaborate conspiracy case against management-
level members of the organization is seldom justi-
fied even in those rare situations where it is possible
to establish such a case. Consequently, conspiracy
is a device which on the whole has been reserved for
ward. It is settled that 'an overt act of one partner
may be the act of all without any new agreement
specifically directed to that act.' United States v.
Kissel, 218 U.S. 601,608.... The governing principle is
the same when the substantive offense is committed
by one of the conspirators in furtherance of the unlaw-
ful project." Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S.
640 (1946). Accord, Pereira v. United States, 347
U.S. 1 (1954); cases collected in Comment, Develop-
inents in the Law: Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 135.
139 Periera v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954)..
140 Many statutes contain a stipulation that in no
case may the penalty imposed for violating the con-
spiracy provision be greater than would be imposed
for committing the substantive offense which was the
object of the conspiracy. "If, however, the offense,
the commission of which is the object of the con-
spiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for
such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punish-
ment provided for such misdemeanor." 18 U.S.C.
§371 (1950). See also, e.g., ANNOT. CALIF. CODES(Penal) §182 (1955); Wis. STAT. ANN. §939.31 (1957).
In some states conspiracy is a misdemeanor even if
the object of the conspiracy is a felony. See, e.g., CoNs.
LAws NEW Yoaic ANN. (Penal) §580 (1960 Supp.). In
New York, however, conspiracies to commit certain
felonies, most notably murder, extortion, and narcotics
peddling, are singled out for treatment as felonies.
See CONS. LAws NEw YORK Am. (Penal) §580-a
(1960 Supp.).
tying management-level organization members to
the more serious criminal acts. This is an evenmnore
difficult undertaking than establishing their con-
nection with the regular business operation of the
organization. The conviction of Louis "Lepke"
Buchalter for one of the murders committed at his
direction by the infamous "Murder, Inc.," is one of
the few successful examples of this technique.14i
Similarly, some management-level organization
members have succumbed to conspiracy cases for
violating narcotics laws."'
Another technique for rendering organization
leaders criminally responsible for organization
crimes is that pioneered in some of the new gam-
bling codes which have created specific crimes,
carrying substantial criminal sanctions, to cover
the acts which management-level members of the
organization are likely to commit themselves in
conjunction with the normal operation of the
organization's enterprises. For example, in Wis-
consin it is made criminal to "share in the proceeds"
of a gambling enterprise.1"' Although they do not
ordinarily handle the dice table, or hold title to a
gambling casino in their own names, management-
level organization members do "share in the
proceeds" of these activities. Of course, it would be
naive to suggest that this legislation or legislation
like it sweeps away all problems and paves the way
to successful prosecution of all management-level
organization members. But it is an important step
forward. By isolating the acts committed by
management-level organization members in con-
junction with the organization's activities and as-
signing a greater penalty to such acts than would
be warranted against the acts of lesser members of
the organization, legislators can make it worth-
while for law enforcement agencies to prosecute
management-level organization members for their
role in organization enterprises.
2. Obtaining Evidence Against Management-Level
Members of Criminal Organizations
Central to the problem of convicting organization
leaders under any prosecutive theory which links
them with the substantive crimes committed by an
organization is that of adducing sufficient admis-
sible evidence to establish the requisite association
141 For an interesting and factual account of the
entire Lepke investigation and prosecution see TuiKus,
MURDER, InC. (1958).
112 See, e.g., United States v. Bruno, 105 F.2d 921(2d Cir.) rev'd, 308 U.S. 287 (1939); United States v.
Masciale, 236 F.2d 601 (2d Cir. 1956), aff'd, 356 U.S.
386.
3 Wisc. STAT. Am. 945.03 (1) (1957).
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with the organization's criminal activities. Our
legal system relies almost exclusively upon the
direct testimony of human eye witnesses to estab-
lish the facts upon which criminal guilt must rest.
At the same time, organized crime, as discussed in
the first installment of this article,'4 has generated
pressures which make it extremely difficult to ob-
tain voluntary testimony against criminal syndi-
cates from human witnesses. Two basic approaches
to this fundamental obstacle to effective action
against organized crime are suggested. On the one
hand, legal steps can be initiated which will tend
to induce persons who are potential witnesses
against a criminal organization to offer their
testimony despite the threats or rewards which the
organization may wave before them. Alternatively,
the stifling of the testimony of human witnesses by
organized crime can be counteracted through ob-
taining and introducing evidence not derived from
the voluntary testimony of human witnesses. Both
of these approaches will be considered in the subse-
quent sections of this article.
a. Inducing Potential Witnesses Against Organiza-
tion Leaders To Testify Truthfully
Four separate techniques will be discussed which
tend to encourage potential witnesses to testify:
(a) Legally compelling potential witnesses to offer
relevant information against organized crime
during investigation and at formal judicial pro-
ceedings; (b) Granting immunity from prosecution
to lesser members of criminal organizations;
(c) Discouraging acts and threats calculated to
intimidate witnesses from testifying against crimi-
nal organizations; (d) Discouraging false testimony
by witnesses either during investigation or at
formal judicial proceedings.
(1) Legally Compelling Potential Witnesses To
Offer Relevant Information Against 'Organized
Crime During Investigation and at Formal Judicial
Proceedings. Any potential witness against a crimi-
nal organization is confronted with many forces
tending to suggest silence as his best course of con-
duct. If these persons are to be induced to come
forward and testify, society must manage to gener-
ate some countervailing pressures. Many witnesses
will not speak out because they are unwilling to
risk punishment which they fear will be visited
upon them by the organization if they do testify.
144 The rewards and punishments with which criminal
organizations influence potential witnesses are dis-
cussed in Part I of this series, 53 J. C=an. L., C. &
P. S. 399, 416-18 (1962).
And these witnesses will remain silent unless
society renders silence equally risky. This can be
done by invoking criminal penalties upon any
person who fails to volunteer any relevant informa-
tion which he possesses concerning the activities of
organized crime. Of course, society cannot with
good conscience place persons in this dilemma
unless full provision is made to insure that the
organization is never able successfully to carry out
its threatened violence against the witness.
At the present time, very few American juris-
dictions impose any criminal penalties upon those
who fail to convey information within their knowl-
edge to proper authorities at early stages of crimi-
nal investigation. However, certain states have
broadly drawn misprison-of-felonyl 45  statutes
'" "To constitute the offense of misprison of felony
there must be mere knowledge of the fact that a felony
is to be committed or has been committed and neglect
either to prevent its commission or to bring the offen-
der to justice, after its commission." MrER, CRIMINAL
LAw 466 (1934).
The foregoing statement represents the usual formu-
lation of the common law crime of misprison of felony.
The crime was defined and applied in its full com-
mon law meaning in State v. Biddle, 124 Atl. 804 (Del.
1923), to a woman who had been present at a rob-
bery, without participation in the robbery, but who
had failed to convey her knowledge of the crime to the
authorities. In State v. Wilson, 80 Vt. 249, 67 Atl. 533
(1907), the court pointed out the distinction between
misprison of felony and an accessory.
"Misprison of felony is an offense at common law,
and is described as a criminal neglect either to prevent
a felony from being committed or to bring the offender
to justice after its commission, but without such
previous concert with or subsequent assistance of him
as will make the concealer an accessory before or after
the fact."
If the above styled version of the crime of misprison
of felony prevailed in the United States, a clearly
enforcible duty to disclose material information con-
cerning criminal acts would be imposed upon all
citizens. However, the concept of misprison of felony
has been sharply limited even in those few jurisdictions
where it exists. One frequent limitation is the require-
ment that the witness have some evil motive for his
neglect to inform, i.e., that he have a specific intent
to thwart justice.
"On the question of intent,.., the motive prompting
the neglect of a misprison must be in some form evil as
respects the administration of justice." State v. Wilson,
supra, 67 Atl. at 534.
A second limitation is the requirement which pertains
in several jurisdictions, that the witness take positive
steps toward concealment of the crime or the criminal
rather than merely negatively failing to report his
knowledge to lawful authority. See, e.g., United States
v. Farrar, 38 F.2d 515 (D. Mass. 1930), aff'd, 281 U.S.
624, in which the court held that there are two ele-
ments to a violation of 18 U.S.C. §4, the federal mis-
prison of felony statute. There must be both a positive
act of concealment and a failure to disclose. Conse-
quently, the defendant, who had purchased liquor from
a bootlegger and failed to disclose the sale, but who
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which under certain circumstances do punish the
failure to offer such evidence to law enforcement
officials. Unfortunately, even in those states which
have this type of statute, it is seldom of use against
organized crime. In most jurisdictions, these
statutes apply only to treason or serious felonies. 46
Since many of the illegal business operations con-
ducted by criminal organizations involve only mis-
demeanor offenses, no affirmative enforceable duty
rests upon those who witness organization crimes
to come forward or even respond to questioning
even in those states which have some form of
compulsory disclosure statutes.
This type of provision is bound to incur stiff
opposition. It tends to place the innocent person
who happened to witness an organization crime in
a very precarious position, facing prison if he fails
to speak and possible physical injury or death if he
does. It is a drastic measure which probably de-
serves and will receive more support if confined to
individuals who themselves are tarnished some-
what by their dealings with organized crime. Thus,
it might be feasible to modify existing gambling
statutes to remove the criminal liability for patron-
izing an illegal gambling operation but impose an
enhanced penalty for being a patron and refusing
to offer relevant evidence against the operation.47
At a later stage of investigation, before a grand
had taken no other step to conceal the felony of selling
liquor, was held not liable for violation of 18 U.S.C.
§4. Accord, Bratton v. United States, 73 F.2d 795
(10th Cir. 1934); United States v. Worcester, 190 F.
Supp. 548 (D. Mass. 1960).
146 See, e.g., PA. STATS. ANN. (Purdon), §4202; 18
U.S.C. §4.
147 Pennsylvania has a statute of this nature. How-
ever, it is applicable only to a peculiar type of offense,
far removed from the preserves of organized crime-
the sale of cigarettes to minors. The statute imposes a
penalty on a minor found to possess cigarettes only f
he refuses to furnish information concerning the person
from whom he purchased the cigarettes.
"Whoever, being a minor, and being in possession
of a cigarette or of cigarette paper, and being by any
police officers, constable or juvenile court officer,
truant officer, or teacher in any school, asked where
and from whom such cigarettes or cigarette paper was
obtained, refuses to furnish such information, shall,
upon conviction thereof in a summary proceeding,
being of the age of sixteen (16) years or upwards, be
sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding five dollars($5), or to undergo an imprisonment in the jail ... not
exceeding five (5) days, or both." PA. STAT ANN.
(Purdon) §4649.
If this societal pressure is not considered dispro-
portionate when held over the head of a young boy or
girl merely to prevent the spread of cigarette smok-
ing among teenagers, it would not seem inappropriate
that similar pressures be invoked to encourage testi-
mony which is necessary to curb the power of an org-
anism posing a threat to the entire society.
jury or similar formal investigatory agency,149
witnesses normally can be compelled to provide in-
formation concerning crimes of which they have
knowledge. Contempt, either by statute or com-
mon law, is almost universally available to compel
information from a recalcitrant grand jury wit-
ness.4 9 Thus, if a victim or an incidental bystander
witness can be identified and called before an in-
vestigative grand jury, his testiniony often can be
procured. At least, a countervailing pressure will be
exerted upon him to give such testimony, and this
pressure may be sufficient to overcome any fear of
reprisal which a criminal organization may have
engendered.
(2) Granting Immunity From Prosecution to
Lesser Members of Criminal Organizations. Before
the legal compulsions described in the foregoing
section can be employed to obtain evidence from
organization members, their legal right to refuse to
testify must be'removed. Unlike other witnesses to
organization crimes, these men are implicated di-
rectly or indirectly in the offenses about which
their testimony is desired. Any evidence they might
provide would tend to incriminate them. Conse-
quently, when any attempt is made to invoke
criminal sanctions against organization members
to compel them to give evidence either to the
police or to a grand jury, they are constitutionally
privileged to remain silent.ln0 In order to render
these witnesses amenable to the same sanctions
available to compel testimony from ordinary
witnesses, it is necessary to obviate the possibility
that their testimony can be used to convict them.
Accordingly, some method must be afforded of im-
munizing organization witnesses from prosecution
for the acts about which their testimony is required.
In many jurisdictions this method is available in
the form of "immunity" statutes.15' Some states
118 A summary of the various bodies, legislative,
judicial, executive, and administrative, which in onejurisdiction or another are empowered to compel
testimony is contained in 8 WVIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§2195 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
14 People v. Finkel, 157 Misc. 781, 284 N.Y. Supp.
725 (1935). Moreover, a witness who does not refuse
to answer questions put to him before a grand jury,
but attempts to stymie the inquiry by giving eva-
sive answers can likewise be held in contempt.
Loubriel v. United States, 9 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1926);
Finkel v. McCook, 247 App. Div. 57, 286 N.Y. Supp.
755 (1936).110 "The privilege is that of the person under exami-
nation as witness...." 8 WioGoRE, op. cit. supra note
148, at §2270.
"I These immunity statutes, both state and federal,
are summarized in 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note
148, at §2281, n.11.
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have general immunity statutes which allow the
immunization of witnesses in the investigation of
any crime. 112 In other states, immunity can be ex-
tended only in the investigation of certain enumer-
ated crimes.5 A grant of immunity also is often
authorized in the implementation of regulatory
legislation, particularly in the federal jurisdiction. 54
Whatever the source or the purpose of the im-
munity grant, it is effective to exempt the im-
munized person from prosecution within the juris-
diction for any crimes about which he testifies.'55
And, once the immunity is effective, the witness
cannot invoke his constitutional privilege to avoid
self-incrimination, since self-incrimination is im-
possible. He can be legally compelled to testify.1,i 6
Because of the insulation of organization leaders
10 See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, §714.1.
"Whenever, in any investigation before a grandjury or trial in a court of record of any person charged
with a criminal offense (either felony or misdemeanor),
it shall appear to the court that any person called
as a witness in behalf of the prosecution is a material
witness and that his testimony or any evidence he
may produce, documentary or otherwise, would tend
to incriminate him, on motion of the State's Attorney
the court may cause an order to be entered of record
that such witness be released from all liability to be
prosecuted or punished on account of any transaction,
matter or thing concerning which he may be required
to testify or produce evidence, documentary or other-
wise; and such order shall forever after be a bar to any
indictment, information or prosecution against the
witness for any felony or misdemeanor shown in whole
or part by such testimony or evidence, documentary
or otherwise, except for perjury committed in the giving
of such testimony. .. "
'5 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL CODE §2447. This section
sets forth the procedure for granting immunity.
However, immunity is available only in the investiga-
tion of offenses which contain a provision incorporating
section 2447 by reference.
"I See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §49 (Federal Trade Act); 29
U.S.C. §209 (Fair Labor Standards Act); 42 U.S.C.
§2201 (c) (Atomic Energy Act); 12 U.S.C. §1820 (d)
(Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. Act); 15 U.S.C. §78
u(d) (Security and Exchange Act of 1934).
155 However, it is not necessary to the validity of an
immunity statute that it immunize the witness from
prosecution by other states or the federal government.
United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 140 (1939). A
witness compelled to testify after a grant of immunity
in a state proceeding can then be prosecuted on the
basis of that testimony in a federal court. Feldman v.
United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944). For an excellent
discussion of the interaction of Federal and state
immunity statutes, see Note, Federal-State Cooperation
in the Area of Self-Incrimination and Double Jeopardy,
55 Nw. U.L. REv. 110 (1960).
156 "While the constitutional provision in question isjustly regarded as one of the most valuable prerogatives
of the citizen, its object is fully accomplished by the
statutory immunity and we are therefore of opinion
that the witness was compellable to answer. ..."
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 610 (1896). Accord,
Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
from the crimes committed by their organizations,
the availability of the immunity technique is of
extreme importance to the conviction of manage-
ment-level organization members. To connect the
leaders with the crime, it will be necessary to
extract testimony from at least some of the under-
lings. Unfortunately, this technique is not available
in all states. Moreover, the Uniform State Witness
Immunity Act, which has been adopted by
Illinois 15 7 and has influenced immunity legislation
in other states, is virtually useless against organized
crime. That Act carries the proviso that no person
can be compelled to testify in a state proceeding if
the court can apprehend any possibility of incrimi-
nation under the laws of another state or of the
federal government.' s5 Since there is at least the
possibility that federal jurisdiction might attach in
regard to almost any crime committed by a crimi-
nal organization, immunity can seldom, if ever, be
effectively extended to organization members in a
state which has enacted the Uniform Act, or a
similar provision.
In some instances it is desirable to attempt to
glean testimony from a witness to whom it is not
feasible to extend immunity. In some jurisdictions
it is possible to influence such a person to waive his
rights against self-incrimination by threatening
him with loss of a valuable position or privilege if
he does invoke the Fifth Amendment. Thus, in
some states the testimony of public employees can
usually be obtained without extending immunity,
because their positions are automatically forfeit if
they claim the privilege. 59 Similarly, various state
117 ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, §714.1.
158 The proviso reads: "[Tihe court shall deny a
motion of a State's Attorney made under this section
and shall not enter an order releasing such witness
from such liability if it shall reasonably appear to the
court that such testimony or evidence... would
subject such witness to an indictment, information or
prosecution.., under the laws of another State or of
the United States.. .."
In Illinois, this proviso has been so construed
as virtually to swallow up the power of the state to
grant immunity under the statute. In People v.
Burkert, 7 Ill. 2d 506, 131 N.E.2d 495 (1956), the
Illinois Supreme Court held that a witness is entitled
to refuse to testify despite a grant of immunity where
there is even a possibility of incrimination under
federal law, no matter even how obscure the connection
between the requested testimony and potential federal
violation.
159 See, e.g., LA. Rxv. STAT. No. 253, §7 (1940),
repealed, LA. REv. STAT. No. 104, §40 (1944). Wigmore
was one of the most vocal proponents of such a modi-
fication of the privilege against self-incrimination.
"In a period and a jurisdiction where corruption
in various forms becomes rife, the principle of waiver
may need to be systematically invoked for persons who
[Vol. 54
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business and professional licenses and similar privi-
leges can be revoked if the licensee refuses to waive
his self-incrimination rights.16 Presumably, these
privileges could also be indefinitely revoked for
failing to testify as to some pertinent question
during the inquiry.
Of course, granting immunity to an organization
member will not always guarantee that truthful
testimony can be elicited from him even under
threat of contempt. The tradition of silence is
deeply ingrained in the fabric of many criminal
organizations. How deeply ingrained was dramati-
cally illustrated during the grand jury probes which
grew out of the ill-famed Apalachin conference of
top level organization leaders in 1958. Several
participants in the conference who had been im-
munized spent up to two years in prison rather than
reveal the purpose or content of the meeting.
(3) Discouraging Acts and Threats Calculated To
Intimidate Witnesses From Testifying Against
Criminal Organizations. In addition to exerting
countervailing pressures upon potential witnesses
to encourage them to give evidence against organ-
ized crime, society must undertake measures which
will tend to diminish the inhibitory pressures em-
ployed by criminal organizations against these
same witnesses. To accomplish this, severe penal-
ties must be inflicted upon anyone who uses threats
or bribes in an attempt to influence persons who
have observed crimes to refrain from furnishing
truthful testimony. A witness or juror will respond
more readily to exhortations regarding his public
duty to testify or to the threat of imprisonment for
contempt if his fears concerning physical reprisal
at the hands of a criminal organization are mini-
mized. To accomplish this purpose, severe penalties
must be inflicted upon anyone who uses threats or
bribes in an attempt to influence witnesses.
Most jurisdictions already have statutes which
punish certain forms of interference with selected
classes of witnesses. These include bribery stat-
utes,16' subornation of perjury laws, 16 2 obstiuction
are candidates for public office and for persons who
propose to contract with the Government for goods
and services." 8 WioGoRE, EVmENCE, §2275a, at 436.
160 See, e.g., LA. Rav. STAT. §38: 2182.
1 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL CODE, §2440.
"A person who gives or offers or promises to give, to
any witness or person about to be called as a witness,
any bribe, upon any understanding or agreement that
the testimony of such witness shall be thereby influ-
enced ... is guilty of a felony."
iG See, e.g., ILL. REv. Cr. Cor-, art. 32-3.
(a) A person commits subornaticn of perjury when
he procures or induces another to make a statement in
of justicein and in some cases catch-all statutes
which punish any incitement of a witness to com-
mit perjury or refrain from attending a legal pro-
ceeding. 64 However, most of these are inadequate
in one respect or another. Many extend this pro-
tection only to witnesses who have been sub-
poenaed to appear before a grand jury, at a trial,
or in some other formal proceeding. 6 5 To be effec-
tive the sanctions must apply against any attempt
to tamper with any person who possesses material
knowledge concerning a crime. 6 The sanction
must be available whether or not the witness has
been formally subpoenaed, interviewed by the
authorities, or is even known to the police. Other-
wise a criminal organization will make its threats
early and thereby discourage potential witnesses
from coming forward initially with information.
Moreover, in most states the penalties attaching
to these crimes are not commensurate with the
gravity of their corrupting effect.'6 It is common to
find bribery punished more severely than the use
of threats or violence to influence a witness, al-
though the latter is a more common technique for
quieting potential witnesses against a criminal or-
violation of [the perjury section] which the person
knows to be false." See also, N.Y. PENAL CODE §§1632,
1632-a.in See, e.g., ILL. REv. CRl. CODE, art. 31-4.
"A person obstructs justice when, with intent to
prevent the apprehension or obstruct the prosecution
or defense of any person, he knowingly commits any
of the following acts:...(b) Induces a witness having knowledge material
to the subject at issue to leave the State or conceal
himself. .. ." See also, 18 U.S.C. §1503.
16A See, e.g., PURDON'S PA. STATS. ANN. §4324.
"Whoever unlawfully dissuades, hinders, or pre-
vents, or attempts to dissuade, hinder, or prevent any
witness from attending and testifying before any
... judicial tribunal, when so required by virtue of
any legal process or otherwise, is guilty of a mis-
demeanor."
165 See, e.g., United States v. Scoratow, 137 F. Supp.
620, 621 (W.D. Pa. 1956), in which the court held:
"There appears to be no case which holds that inter-
ference with witnesses in an investigation being con-
ducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or any
similar instrumentality of the government, violates
Section 1503 [the Federal obstruction of justice stat-
ute].... " Cf. United States v. Perlstein, 126 F.2d
789 (3rd Cir. 1942).
160 The relevant provision of the recently enacted
Illinois Criminal Code appears to meet these minimal
requirements. See note 163 supra.
16 See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. §31-4, which imposes a
maximum penalty of three years, N.Y. PENAL CODE
§2441, which makes the prevention of witnesses'
attendance only a misdemeanor, and PuwoN's PA.
STAT. §4324, which calls for a maximum penalty of
one year.
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ganization.' Tampering with witnesses and jurors
is an offense which strikes at the very foundations
of our society, and as practiced by organized crime
demands the imposition of the most severe sanc-
tions. A criminal organization will not be dissuaded
even momentarily from bringing all available pres-
sures against a witness who threatens to jeopardize
vital organization functions or personnel by the
possibility that misdemeanor statutes will be vio-
lated.
(4) Discouraging False Testimwny by Witnesses
Either During Investigation or at Trial. Assuming
that through a combination of legal pressures and
moral suasion, a witness to an organization crime
can be induced to make some statement concerning
the crime, it remains necessary to encourage truth-
fulness and completeness in the statement. The
witness must feel a compulsion not only to speak
but to speak truthfully, since organized crime will
be attempting to encourage lies if it cannot induce
silence. In general, these statements will occur at
one of two stages-either during the informal
police investigation, or during formal judicial pro-
ceedings.
During police interrogation of persons who may
have evidence relevant to a crime, a reluctant wit-
ness confronted with a question from the police
often may either deny outright any knowledge of
the crime, or may provide false information con-
,cerning the crime he observed. In several juris-
dictions, it is a crime to make a false statement to a
police officer.6 9 Accordingly, in these states a false
description of the crime the witness observed would
be punishable. However, ordinarily a false denial of
any knowledge of a crime is not an offense' 7 0
Once a witness is called in a formal judicial pro-
168 Compare, e.g., N.Y. PENAL CODE §2440, which
renders the bribery of witnesses a felony, with N.Y.
PENAL CODE §814, which renders the use of threats
to dissuade a witness from attending a proceeding
(see People v. Leik, 265 N.Y. 580, 193 N.E. 329 (1934))
merely a misdemeanor. Also of dubious rationality are
the respective penalties imposed for perjury and
subornation of perjury in the new Illinois Criminal
Code. A person who commits perjury faces a possible
14 years imprisonment, while the individual or gang
which induced him through threats, bribery, or other
pressure to commit the act of perjury can receive a
maximum of only five years.
169 See, e.g., United States v. Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190(D. Md. 1955) (false statement to FBI agent conducting
investigation); Brandon v. United States, 268 F.2d
559 (9th Cir. 1959) (false statement to Internal Reve-
nue agents).
170 United States v. Davey, 155 F. Supp. 175(S.D.N.Y. 1957). Cf., United States v. Philipe, 173 F.
Supp. 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
ceeding and is placed under oath, his statements
are all made under pain of perjury. Unfortunately,
perjury in many jurisdictions is an unwieldy en-
forcement sanction entwined in technicalities and
bearing the added load of an enormous burden of
proof required for conviction. Most of these stat-
utes require that the offending statement be one
which was signed or sworn to by the witness and
must concern a matter material to the investiga-
tion.17' The most onerous aspect of this standard of
proof is the so-called "two-witness" rule, which re-
quires that the government establish the falsity of
the witness's statement by the testimony of two
other witnesses." In most jurisdictions this rule has
been watered down to a requirement of one witness
and corroboration.ln But contradictory statements
under oath are not sufficient to convict 1 4 Conse-
quently, if a witness is the only one who observed
an event, or if there is only one other who did, he
can lie in a judicial proceeding with impunity.
Moreover, he can change his testimony from one
proceeding to another, from truth to falsity, with-
out fear of legal sanction. Some states, including
New York, have abolished the "two-witness"
rule. 75 And New York has made contradictory
statements under oath presumptive evidence of the
guilt of the witness in a perjury prosecution. 17 6
17' Shaffer v. Kintzer, 1 Binn. (Pa.) 542 (1809).
Generally a witness's statement is considered
material if it will tend to prove the issues involved in
the proceeding or would tend to corroborate or dis-
credit evidence which does bear on these issues. Com-
monwealth v. DeCost, 35 Pa. Super. 88 (1907).
'71 Commonwealth v. Leitch, 185 Pa. Super. 261,
137 A.2d 909 (1958).
-- Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606 (1945);
People v. Darcy, 139 P.2d 118, 59 Cal. App. 2d 342
(1943); Commonwealth v. Antico, 22 A.2d 204, 146
Pa. Super. 293 (1941).
1 See, e.g., Duval v. State, 104 So. 2d 789, 791 (Fla.
1958), quoting with approval Hall v. State, 136 Fla.
644, 187 So. 392, 404:
-"It is quite generally held that it is not sufficient to
prove a charge of perjury by merely proving that the
defendant had, at different times, testified to two op-
posite things irreconcilable with each other. There must
be testimony outside the defendant's own contradic-
tory statements as to which of such statements is
false... " Williams v. State, 41 So. 2d 605, 34 Ala.
App. 462 (1949), cert. den7rf4 41 So.2d 608, 252 Ala. 445;
70 C. J. S., Perjury, §68, ,, ;37-38. But see, Common-
wealth v. Sumrak, 25 A.- 1 605, 148 Pa. Super. 412
(1942).
175 New York has abolished the two-witness rule
by statute. See N.Y. PENAL CODE, §1627. California
has by court decision adhered to a "one-witness" rule
rather than a "two-witness" rule. People v. O'Donnell,
132 Cal. App. 2d 840, 283 P.2d 714 (1955).
176 "In any prosecution for perjury the falsity of the
testimony or statement set forth in the indictment or
information shall be presumptively established by
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Because of the generally heavy penalties pro-
vided, a modern perjury statute stripped of the
dibilitating technicalities of common law perjury
can be a strong deterrent to false testimony in any
hearing to which it applies.1i Even witnesses who
have been subjected to threats of physical harm if
they give evidence against a criminal organization
will face the countervailing legal threat of a perjury
prosecution if they fail to testify truthfully. The
prevailing rule in American jurisdictions is that
threats or other forms of duress do not justify a
witness in committing perjury in a judicial pro-
ceeding.'78 Since the witness is isolated from im-
mediate harm in the court room and is able to call
upon the protection of law enforcement officers,
courts do not deem the danger sufficiently im-
mediate to render the act of offering false testimony
necessary.17
b. Obtaining and Introducing Evidence Which Is
Not Derived From the Voluntary Testimony of
Human Witnesses.
Even in jurisdictions which have available all the
techniques discussed in the previous section for
procuring voluntary testimony against organized
crime (and these jurisdictions are few), the evidence
necessary to establish a prosecutable case against
organization leaders often will not be forthcoming.
The fellow members of a criminal organization
whose testimony is so critical to any prosecution
against the organization leadership will remain par-
ticularly reluctant despite the pressures which
proof that the defendant has testified... under oath
to the contrary thereof on any occasion in which an
oath is required by law. . . "N.Y. PENAL CODE §1627.
In its recently enacted revised criminal code, Illinois
has included a similar provision. See ILL. REv. CGRm.
CODE art. 32-2.
177 See, e.g., ILL. REv. Cum. CODE §32-2, and CALUF.
PENAL CODE §118, which provide a maximum penalty
of 14 years imprisonment for perjury; PURnoN's PA.
STATS. ANN., which imposes a maximum of seven years,
and N.Y. PENAL CODE §1620a, which sets a maximum
penalty of five years.
178 See cases collected at 40 A.L.R.2d 914.
179 "[Tlhe single question is whether a man may
justify or excuse deliberate perjury against the life and
liberty of others on the ground that he was coerced to
the perjury by fear engendered by the threats of
others.... [Tihe impelling danger, however, should be
present, imminent, and impending, and not to be
avoided. Such was not the character of the duress here;
and the appellant was not only possessed of the power
and right of protecting himself, but he also could have
appealed to the law to shield him from the threatened
danger." Bain v. State, 67 Miss. 557, 7 So. 408, 409(1890). But cf., People v. McClintic, 193 Mich. 589,
160 N.W. 461; Hall v. State, 136 Fla. 644, 187 So. 392
(1939).
society may exert. Accordingly, the potential for
convicting the leaders of organized crime can be en-
hanced immeasurably by reducing the dependence
upon voluntary human testimony. Three other
classes of evidence will be considered which may be
particularly valuable in prosecutions of organiza-
tion leaders for the criminal acts committed by
their subordinates in a criminal organization. These
include: (a) statements of human witnesses ob-
tained and introduced without their consent;
(b) physical evidence obtained without the consent
of the custodian; and (c) statutory presumptions
employed to replace human testimony in establish-
ing a prima facie case.
(1) Statements of Witnesses Obtained and Intro-
duced Without Their Consent. Despite any legal or
moral pressures the government is able to bring to
bear upon persons who have witnessed organiza-
tion crimes, seldom will it be able to procure
voluntary testimony from all the witnesses neces-
sary to link these crimes to the organization leaders
who ordered them. Accordingly, successful prosecu-
tion of a leading figure in organized crime often
will require techniques which allow the government
to obtain and use testimony without the consent of
the witness. These techniques generally entail some
form of eavesdropping. All forms of eavesdropping
have a common purpose and some common charac-
teristics. In each, a third person, ordinarily con-
nected officially with the law enforcement body,
places himself in a position with or without the
assistance of certain mechanical and electronic de-
vices from which he can overhear and often record
the conversations of suspected persons. From what
is overheard, the law enforcement agents, without
the consent of the speakers, glean statements which
may be admissible or obtain investigative leads
which may lead to other evidence which will con-
vict organization leaders.
The most common and useful type of eavesdrop-
ping is "wiretapping," the interception of telephone
conversations. State legislatures and courts have
varied widely in their reaction to this investigative
technique. The new Illinois Criminal Code, for
example, renders criminal any form of electronic
eavesdropping, including, of course, wiretapping. 80
180 Article 14 of the Illinois Criminal Code of 1961 is
concerned with the crime of "Eavesdropping."
"An eavesdropping device is any device capable of
being used to hear or record oral conversation whether
such conversation is conducted in person, by telephone,
or by any other means...." ILL. REv. Cams. CODE art.
14-1.
"A person commits eavesdropping when he: (a) Uses
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New York, on the other hand, has established a
procedure for affording the state legal authority
to intercept telephone communications upon a
showing of probable cause to believe evidence of a
crime will be disclosed thereby.18' However, the
United States Supreme Court, in a 1957 decision,
Benaiti v. United States,5 2 cast a cloud over the
an eavesdropping device to hear or record all or any
part of any oral conversation without the consent of
any party thereto; or (b) Uses or divulges any informa-
tion which he knows or reasonably should know was ob-
tained through the illegal use of an eavesdropping de-
vice." ILL. RV. Canm. CODE art. 14-2.
"Any evidence obtained in violation of this Article is
not admissible in any civil or criminal trial, or any ad-
ministrative or legislative inquiry or proceeding, nor in
any grand jury proceedings." ILL. REV. CRiM. CODE,
art. 14-5.
1 The relevant provisions of the New York Penal
Code are sections 738, 739, 740, 813-a, and 813-b. Sec-
tion 738 defines the crime of eavesdropping as encom-
passing any unconsented-to recording or overhearing of
a telephone communication or unconsented-to recording
or overhearing of a conversation or discussion. Section
740 renders the crime of eavesdropping as defined in
section 738 a felony punishable by two years imprison-
ment. Section 739 exempts from criminality acts of
eavesdropping which are performed pursuant to an
ex parte order granted according to the provisions of
section 813, which reads in part as follows:
"Sec. 813-a. An ex parte order for eavesdropping...
may be issued by any justice of the supreme court or
judge of a county court.., upon oath or affirmation of
a district attorney, or of the attorney general or of an
officer above the rank of sergeant of any police depart-
ment.., that there is reasonable ground to believe
that evidence of crime may be thus obtained and par-
ticularly describing the person or persons whose com-
munications... are to be overheard or recorded.... "
Section 813-b sanctions eavesdropping by law enforce-
ment officials without an order if they have reasonable
grounds to believe evidence of a crime can be obtained
thereby and if an order is sought within 24 hours of the
initiation of the wiretap or other eavesdropping.
Other states have resolved the problem of curbing
promiscuous eavesdropping by unscrupulous private
detectives and suspicious husbands without unduly
hampering the law enforcement effort through the ex-
pedient of exempting law enforcement officials entirely
from the eavesdropping ban. The various eavesdropping
statutes are summarized in the REPORT OF THE NEW
YORK STATE JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE To STUDY
ILLEGAL INTERCEPTIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS, at 54-71.
The admissibility of wiretapping evidence is discussed
in annotations at 53 A.L.R. 1485, 66 A.L.R. 397 and
134 A.L.R. 614.
'- 355 U.S. 96 (1957). In Benanti the Supreme Court
was concerned with the admissibility in a federal court
of evidence obtained as the result of a wiretap conducted
by state officers. The Court held such evidence inad-
missible on the grounds that its divulgence in a federal
court proceeding would be a violation of section 605 of
the Federal Communications Act. As yet the Court has
declined to rule evidence which has been obtained in
contravention of section 605 to be inadmissible in a state
proceeding. Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952). In
United States ex rel Graziano v. McMann, 275 F.2d
284 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. den., 365 U.S. 854, the Court re-
New York law by holding that divulgence of any
interception by whomever conducted violates
federal law despite its status under state law.
To counteract Benanti and return to the govern-
ment's arsenal this invaluable and often essential
technique for obtaining evidence against organized
crime, the United States Department of Justice
has, as a part of its anti-organized crime package,
proposed new legislation which would modify the
ban against wiretapping presently contained in the
Federal Communications Act.1 In essence, the bill
fused to review a Second Circuit holding that evidence
obtained through a wiretap by New York officers
pursuant to an authorization under N.Y. Penal Code
sec. 813-a was admissible in a state proceeding. The
New York courts have adopted the position that evi-
dence procured through a wiretap is admissible in a
New York proceeding even though the wiretap and the
divulgence in the state court both constitute violations
of section 605. People v. Grant, 14 Misc. 2d 182, 179
N.Y.S.2d 384 (1958). Cf., Horlen Check Cashing Corp.
v. Bell, 296 N.Y. 15, 68 N.E.2d 854 (1946). Pennsyl-
vania has taken a similar position. Commonwealth v.
Voci, 138 A.2d 232, 185 Pa.Super. 563 (1958), aJJ'd, 143
A.2d 652, 393 Pa. 404, cert. den., 358 U.S. 885.
Despite these decisions upholding the use of wiretap
evidence in state proceedings, Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206 (1960), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961), pose a constant threat to the validity of state
laws which sanction the admission in state proceedings
of evidence obtained through a wiretap conducted by
state officers. As a result of these recent Supreme Court
decisions, evidence obtained by state officers during an
illegal search and seizure has been rendered inadmissible
in state as well as federal courts. What the Supreme
Court has done to the law of search and seizure with
these decisions, it may well do with regard to wiretap
evidence in the near future. Moreover, any such ban
would apply to wiretaps on all wire or wireless com-
munications, intrastate as well as interstate, inasmuch
as the Court already has held that section 605 applies
to intrastate communication. Weiss v. United States,
308 U.S. 321 (1939).
8 The relevant portion of section 605 of the Federal
Communications Act (47 U.S.C. §605) reads as follows:
"[t,]o person not being authorized by the sender shall
intercept any communication and divulge or publish
the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or
meaning of such intercepted communication to any
person....
This statute was first held to bar the admission of
evidence derived from a wiretap couducted by law en-
forcement agents in Nardone v. United States, 302
U.S. 379 (1938). In Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S.
321 (1939), it was held to apply to intrastate as well as
interstate communication. The Supreme Court has
limited the scope of this statute only in rendering it in-
applicable to eavesdropping on one end of a telephone
conversation, Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505
(1961), or to listening on an extension with the per-
mission of one of the participants, Rathbun v. United
States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957), in making the wiretap evi-
dence inadmissible only against participants in the
conversation, Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114
(1942), and thus far in restricting the ban to use of the
evidence in federal proceedings. Schwartz v. Texas,
344 U.S. 199 (1952).
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would allow federal officers legally to intercept
telephone conversations upon authorization by the
Attorney General in investigations of certain types
of crime associated with national security. It would
also legitimize wiretapping by state and federal
officers pursuant to court order in investigations of
a class of crimes typically perpetrated by organized
crime.11
Other forms of eavesdropping also are often
essential elements in investigations of organized
crime. These fall into two logical categories:
eavesdropping in which the conversation can be
overheard by the eavesdropper wherever located
without the assistance of any electronic or mechani-
cal device, and eavesdropping which cannot be con-
ducted without the employment of some device."' 1
The legal status of the former type of eavesdrop-
ping is not in doubt in most states, even if the
person eavesdropping utilizes an electronic device
to preserve the conversation." 6 The underlying
rational is that the recording merely preserves and
corroborates what the human witness can testify to
c6ncerning the content of the conversation.1 7
a S. 2813, H.R. 10185, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).185 Not all courts or legislatures, by any means, have
followed even implicitly this logical division. Illinois,
for instance, has by statute barred the use of any type
of device in overhearing or preserving a conversation,
irrespective of the necessity of using the device or the
location of the device. See note 180, supra. See also
N.Y. PENAL CODE §738-2, which renders it a crime for
a person not a participant in a conversation "wilfully
and by means of an instrument" to overhear or record
the conversation.
186 The general underlying rationale which justifies
ordinary eavesdropping and the full utilization of evi-
dence procured thereby was well stated by the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in a case which
actually involved the more difficult question of the use
of an electronic device which magnified the eaves-
dropping power of the government agents.
"There was only an instance of eavesdropping which
alone, though an invasion of privacy, is not a violation
of a recognized legal right to privacy. Conspirators who
discuss their unlawful schemes must take the risk of
being overheard and the risk of having what is over-
heard used against them provided there is otherwise no
trespass by the listener or violation of a statutory right
to use a means of communication thus made immune
from interception." United States v. Goldman, 118
F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. den., 313 U.S. 588, aff'd,
316 U.S. 129. Cf., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438 (1928); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505
(1961).
18 7 Hutson v. State, 296 S.W.2d 245, 164 Cr. 24
(Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1956); People v. Malotte, 292
P.2d 517, 46 Cal.2d 59 (1956), app. disin., 352 U.S. 805.
Cf., On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952), in
which an informant carrying a concealed microphone
and transmitting device engaged the defendant in con-
versation, which conversation was transmitted to law
However, in Illinois, even this use of an electronic
instrument would appear to be illegal.
The legal status of the second species of eaves-
dropping is less settled. This form of eavesdropping
usually involves secreting microphones on premises
occupied by persons whose conversations may be
relevant, or pointing highly sensitive listening
instruments in the direction of the conversation.
There are no constitutional restrictions on elec-
tronic eavesdropping as such.18a However, in Silver-
man v. United States,"59 the Supreme Court held the
implanting of a "spike mike" in a common wall,
which had the effect of turning the entire heating
system into a giant microphone, was a violation of
the Fourth Amendment, and the evidence procured
thereby was suppressed. The apparent holding of
the case is that the use of eavesdropping techniques
is unconstitutional where it requires that the
officers must commit a trespass upon private
premises in order to place the eavesdropping device
in position to receive the conversation.9 0 Subject
to this constitutional limitation, state legislators
appear free to authorize law enforcement officers
to employ this valuable evidence-gathering tech-
nique against organized crime.
The conversations overheard through wire-
tapping or other forms of eavesdropping not only
yield leads which law enforcement officers can
utilize to obtain other types of evidence, but also,
although nominally hearsay, they often are them-
selves admissible at trial against the speakers and
their co-conspirators. Since the persons being sub-
jected to eavesdropping generally are organization
enforcement agents and was the subject of testimony
by these agents at the trial.
The cases discussing this problem are collected in
Annotation, Admissibility of Sound Recordings as
Affected by Means of Obtaining, 168 A.L.R. 927.
188 Olmstead v. United States, supra note 186; United
States v. Goldman, supra note 186. Cf. Silverman v.
United States, supra note 183.
181 Note 183, supra.
110 "We need not here contemplate the Fourth
Amendment implications of these and other frightening
paraphernalia which the vaunted marvels of an elec-
tronic age may visit upon human society. Nor do the
circumstances here make necessary a re-examination of
the Court's previous decisions in this area. For a fair
reading of the record in this case shows that the eaves-
dropping was accomplished by means of an unauthorized
physical penetration into the premises occupied by the
petitioners.
"Eavesdropping accomplished by means of such a
physical intrusion is beyond the pale of even those de-
cisions in which a closely divided Court has held that
eavesdropping accomplished by other electronic means did
not amount to an invasion of Fourth Amendment
rights." 365 U.S. at 509-10. (Emphasis supplied.)
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members, their statements are competent as ad-
missions against themselves and as statements in
furtherance of the conspiracy in proceedings
against other organization members.19'
Because of the nature of organized crime, eaves-
dropping in its various forms has necessarily
assumed a key role. Frank Hogan, District At-
torney of New York County, has stated that
without the availability of such evidence-gathering
techniques the convictions of an imposing list of
organization leaders, including Charles "Lucky"
Luciano, Johnny "Dio" Dioguardi, Frank Carbo,
and Joe "Adonis" Doto would have been im-
possible.192
(2) Physical Evidence Obtained Without the
Consent of the Custodian. Many of the prime
revenue producing enterprises of criminal organiza-
tions involve the wholesaling or retailing of certain
illegal commodities or illegal services. These
businesses ordinarily require the maintenance of
considerable stocks of illegal commodities and the
storage of equipment utilized in the dispensing of
the services. All this physical material and equip-
ment is admissible and cogent evidence against a
criminal organization if it can be obtained by the
authorities. Moreover, as a criminal organization
becomes a larger, richer, more highly organized
business complex, and particularly as it enters
highly regulated legitimate industries, a detailed
system of books and records must be maintained.
It is these books and records which allow an or-
ganization leadership to achieve a measure of
control over widespread enterprises with a mini-
mum of physical presence on the premises where
the illegal businesses are conducted. It is these same
books and records which often can form an evi-
dentiary link between the organization's illegal
activities and the men who direct" them. The
problem confronting law enforcement is to acquire
possession of these various articles of physical evi-
dence under conditions which will allow their
admission in evidence against organized crime.
The legal methods of obtaining physical evi-
dence, chiefly by subpoena duces tecum or search
and seizure, have been the subject of volumes of
legal treatises and periodicals1 3' No attempt will
191 See, e.g., On Lee v. United States, supra note 187;
United States v. Goldman, supra note 186; cases col-
lected at 168 A.L.R. 927.
19 Washington Post, May 12, 1962, p. AS.
193 See, e.g., VARON, SEARCHES, SEIZURES AND IM-
IUNITIES (1961); 8 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE, §2183 (3d ed.
1940); Peterson, Restrilions in the Law of Search and
Seizure, 52 Nw. U.L. REV. 46 (1957); Paulsen, Safe-
be made in this article even to summarize the law
in this area. Rather, discussion will be confined to
certain variations of these techniques which are
peculiarly adaptable to gathering evidence against
organized crime.
As criminal organizations have become larger
and more sophisticated, they have begun exten-
sively to utilize the corporate form of organization,
particularly in their "fronts" and pseudo-legitimate
subsidiaries. This has certain business advantages
as well as simplifying the process of disguising the
true ownership of an enterprise. However, it also
renders the books, records, and other physical
property of an organization more susceptible to
inspection by government agents. Although the
physical property possessed by a corporation is
afforded the same protection from search and
seizure as records or other property owned by a
private person, in most jurisdictions, corporate
property is subject to subpoena under circum-
stances in which an individual could validly invoke
the Fifth Amendment and refuse to submit his
property to governmental scrutiny. 94 Accordingly,
to the extent that a criminal organization has
utilized the corporate form in carrying on its
operations, law enforcement authorities are en-
abled to acquire possession of its potentially
evidence-rich books and records through the
subpoena powers possessed by grand juries or
administrative agencies. Similarly, union records
are also generally subject to subpoena, 19 and by
virtue of a comprehensive regulatory scheme re-
cently enacted by Congress, they can be subjected
to close inspection by the federal government. 196
Thus, in one area in which criminal organizations
frequently specialize, labor racketeering, relevant
books and records are particularly susceptible to
inspection by law enforcement authorities.
Another direction in which organized crime is
continually expanding is into fields of legitimate
guards in the Law of Search and Seizure, 52 Nw. U.L.
REv. 65 (1957).
194 "In the first place, the employee or officer cannot
refuse to produce on the ground that the disclosure
would criminate the corporation.
"Nor can he refuse to produce on the ground that
some parts of the corporate records would criminate
himself, even if suchpartswere madebyhimself ... ." 8
WIG ORE, EVIDENCE §2259b.
See generally, Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361
(1911); Bleakley v. Schlesinger, 267 App. Div. 400, 46
N.Y.S. 2d 508 (1944).
395 United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944); 8
WIOGORE op. cit. supra note 148, at §2259b.
196 29 U.S.C. §521 et. seq. (the administrative pro-
visions of the Landrum-Griffin Act).
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or pseudo-legitimate commerce which are subject
to a high degree of economic and social regulation.
To effectively enforce these systems of regulation,
many jurisdictions require persons in the industry
to maintain certain records and compel the filing
of certain reports. Because these records and
reports are invested with a significant public
interest independent of their evidentiary value, it
has been held that they are "public" property
rather than the private records of the person
keeping them. 97 Therefore, these records and
reports cannot be protected from governmental
inspection merely because they incriminate the
custodian, even though the custodian be an in-
dividual rather than a corporation."' Accordingly,
whenever an activity in which organized crime is
engaged can be properly subjected to regulation
for some legitimate reason, the organization can
be compelled to maintain records freely accessible
to governmental inspection and to file reports
outlining the details of its operations. 19 9 The
federal government appears to have done this on a
limited scale with respect to gambling. By statute
and regulation, all persons liable for the federal
wagering taxes are required to keep certain records
reflecting information concerning bets placed with




197 Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948); People
v. Coombs, 158 N.Y. 532, 53 N.E. 527 (1899); City of
Philadelphia v. Cline, 158 Pa. Super. 179, 44 Atl. 2d 610
(1945); 8 WXIGUox, op. cit. stepra note 148, at §2259c.
19s "T]he privilege which exists as to private papers
cannot be maintained in relation to records required by
law to be kept in order that there may be suitable in-
formation of transactions which are the appropriate
subjects of governmental regulation and the enforce-
ment of restrictions validly established." 335 U.S. at 33.
19 The constitutional limits of this "required records"
doctrine as yet have not been clearly defined. Professor
Morgan has articulated the test he believes appropriate
to determine whether persons engaging in a given ac-
tivity can be compelled to maintain records and make
them available for governmental scrutiny.
"It is believed that in all these situations the funda-
mental question is whether the actor could constitu-
tionally be prohibited from doing the things, not mala in
se, required to be disclosed when he first agreed to make
the disclosures. If so, then the condition of disclosure
may be imposed upon the specific conduct." MORGAN,
BASIC PROBLEMS OP EVIDENcE 147-48 (1957).
200 "Each person liable for tax under this subchapter
shall keep a daily record showing the gross amount of
all wagers on which he is so liable, in addition to all
other records required pursuant to section 6001(a)." 26
U.S.C. §4403.
"Each person required to pay a special tax under
this subchapter shall register with the official in charge
of the internal revenue district-(1) his name and place of residence
(2) ... each place of business where the activity...
is carried on; and
These records are to be available for inspection by
the Internal Revenue Service. In this area, the
predicate for regulation is the necessity of having
reliable information available to insure that the
full tax is being paid by those engaged in the
taxable activity."'1 Labor unions, the trucking
industry, and liquor production and distribution
are among those legitimate industries with a
special appeal to organized crime which are highly
regulated and in which access to relevant records
ordinarily is available to government officials.
The implementation of a regulatory program
often includes a licensing system. A person or firm
cannot engage in the regulated activity without a
license, and receipt and retention of the license
requires conformance with certain standards and
agreement to certain conditions. Some states have
conditioned the granting of licenses upon waiver of
certain constitutional privileges to secrecy. Minne-
sota, for instance, requires that liquor estab-
lishment licensees hold their premises open for
search by state law enforcement officials at all
times, irrespective of whether the officers have a
search warrant or probable cause. 2' Such a search
may yield many types of physical evidence other
than those records which the licensee has been
required to keep pursuant to the regulatory power.
Thus, what would otherwise be unconstitutional
searches and seizures can be rendered constitu-
tionally permissible if the conduct of a given
activity is a privilege subject to withdrawal or
modification at the will of government' 3 Attaching
(3) if he is engaged in receiving wagers for or on be-
half of any [other person] the name and place of
residence of each such person."
26 U.S.C. §4412.
"'1 The record-keeping requirements of the wagering
tax statutes are analogous in purpose and effect to the
record-keeping requirements of the income tax pro-
vision which were upheld in Beard v. United States,
222 F.2d 84 (4th Cir. 1955), cert. den., 350 U.S. 856. The
court of appeals there argued:
"Moreover, the instruction related to the duty im-
posed by the taxing statutes upon the defendant to keep
records of his transactions so lltat the extent of his lia-
bility to income tax might be ascertained; and therefore
the case falls within the rule laid down in Shapiro v.
United States,..." 222 F.2d at 84. (Emphasis sup-
plied'.)
2 "Every sheriff, deputy sheriff, constable, marshal,
policeman, police officer, and peace officer shall observe
and inspect the premises where occupations are carried
on under license .... " MiNN. STAT. Am. §325.56.20 People v. Avas, 300 P.2d 695, 144 Cal. App. 2d 91
(1956), discusses the constitutionality of an informer's
efforts.
"One invited to enter is not a trespasser. His entry
does not become a trespass because he may be alerted to
learn facts or to hear damaging declarations either by his
EARL JOHNSON, JR.
conditions to the issuance of a license is a po-
tentially useful technique for gathering evidence
against a criminal organization, because many of
their illegal enterprises ordinarily are conducted
on premises which are licensed because of closely
associated regulated activities, liquor retailing in
particular. Gambling, prostitution, and narcotics
are often concentrated in bars, nightclubs, and
casinos, each of which can legitimately be subjected
to periodic and thorough searches if the license
for the premises has been conditioned upon a
waiver of the rights of privacy.
Another method of obtaining physical evidence
to which organized crime is especially susceptible
is one in which the seizure is made by or as a
result of investigation by an undercover agent.
Since virtually all of a criminal organization's
enterprises involve the dispensing of illegal
products or services, it must constantly deal with
the consuming public. And no constitutional
amendment guarantees the loyalty of that public
to the criminal organization. If the government
can maneuver an agent into a position where he
will be accepted as an approved buyer of the
organization's product, or if it can subvert a mem-
ber of the existing consuming public, it can obtain
such evidence as is voluntarily sold to the govern-
ment man.204 Thus, the narcotics sold to a govern-
natural faculties of hearing and sight or with mechanical
and electronic aids of science ... ." 300 P.2d at 699.
1o4 There are certain inhibitions on the undercover ac-
tivities of government agents themselves, inhibitions
which evidently do not apply to private citizens who
are employed specially to act as informers.
In Fraternal Order of Eagles v. United States, 57
F.2d 93 (3rd Cir. 1932), a search was held illegal which
was predicated on information obtained by prohibition
agents who had gained entrance to a lodge by falsely
representing themselves as lodge members. The court
held: "A search and seizure following an entry into the
home or office of a person suspected of crime by means
of fraud, stealth, social acquaintance, or under the guise
of a business call are unreasonable and violate the Fourth
Amendment." 57 F.2d at 94. Accord, United States v.
Reckis, 119 F. Supp. 687 (D. Mass. 1954).
On the other hand, although posing as a member of a
special group such as a fraternal order has been held to
vitiate any search resulting from such ruse, the courts
appear to approve of government agents' undercover
work when they merely represent themselves to be
members of the general public, not any special "in-
group." In United States v. Bush, 283 F.2d 51 (6th Cir.
1960), the court upheld a search culminating from an
officer's visit to a "moonshine" outlet where he sought
to make a purchase of untaxpaid liquor as a member of
the general public.
"As to misrepresentations made to Mrs. Bush, we
are of the view that the only misrepresentation was
that the agent hid his identity as an officer and posed as
a member of the general public. Evidence obtained by
law enforcement officers, using the subterfuge of hiding
ment informant may return to haunt the criminal
organization which retailed the drug. Moreover,
the undercover consumer may use his presence on
the premises of the illegal enterprise to observe
sufficient activity to furnish probable cause for a
subsequent issuance of a search warrant to scour
the establishment for further evidence.
The potential usefulness of physical evidence
as a form of proof has been enhanced greatly by
the rapid development of sophisticated methods of
scientific examination and comparison of weapons,
accounting records, fingerprints, documents, and
other types of physical evidence. This class of evi-
dence can now be subjected to intensive analysis,
and the results of this analysis can often be con-
veyed to the jury with conclusive results. In a
recent case against one of the leading racketeers
in the Philadelphia area, virtually the sole
predicate for conviction was a comparison of
records maintained by a large local gambling es-
tablishment with identical figures found on various
scraps of paper discarded by the racketeer with his
trash over a period of several months. The testi-
mony of a documents expert to the effect that the
discarded figures had been prepared by the or-
ganization leader and that they corresponded with
the business summaries of the gambling establish-
ment was sufficient to sustain the conviction.20 5
(3) Statutory Presumptions Employed To Replace
Human Testimony in Establishing a Prima Facie
Case. Many evidentiary gaps which are difficult
to fill through voluntary testimony or the other
forms of evidence discussed in this article can often
be bridged by enacting statutes which alleviate
the government's burden of proof with respect to
elements of a crime which logically accompany the
existence of facts which readily can be proved. In
the usual form of these statutes, proof of one fact
creates a presumption that certain other facts
exist.200 The effect of the presumption is at least
their identity in order to pose as members of the general
public, has consistently been held admissible." 283
F.2d at 51. Accord, Warren v. Territory of Hawaii, 119
F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 1941). Cf. Purifoy v. United States,
170 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1948); United States v. Smith, 43
F.2d 173 (S.D. Tex. 1930).
205 See United States v. Minker, 198 F. Supp. 935
(W.D. Pa. 1961), for a discussion of some of the legal
issues involved in this case.
200 "[Tlhe facts found might be such as to be, in point
of law, inconsistent with any supposition, except that of
the existence or non-existence of the fact in controversy,
in which case the conclusion is necessary, independently
of any belief based upon what is more or less probable,
because the law declares the uniform effect of such a
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to shift the burden of coming forward with the
evidence to the accused, meaping that unless he
furnishes some evidence of innocence, the jury is
justified in convicting him on the basis of the "pre-
sumption" alone.207 Moreover, some statutory
presumptions are phrased in terms which allow the
jury to find the accused guilty solely on the basis
of a "presumption," even though he produces some
evidence of his innocence if they do not consider
his explanation satisfactory.2n The only constitu-
tional limitation on these statutory presumptions
is that there be a rational connection between the
fact which must be proved and the fact which will
be presumed, that is, that in common experience
ordinarily when one exists the other will exist
also.NI
The prosecution of many of the crimes com-
mitted by organized crime has been eased by enact-
ment of statutory presumptions. From possession
of narcotics or gambling equipment it is presumed
that the possessor had an intent to use them
illegallyY0 The person holding legal title to gam-
bling premises or a house of prostitution has been
presumed to be the operator.211 And, in Florida a
state and condition of circumstances." Sun Mutual Ins.
Co. v. Ocean Ins. Co., 107 U.S. 485, 502 (1882).117 New York Life Insurance Co. v. Ganer, 303 U.S.
161 (1938); United States v. Marper, 198 F.2d 186 (3d
Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 876; 9 WIGMooR.,
EvMENCE §§2487(d), 2491 (3d ed. 1940).
208 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §171, which reads in pertinent
part as follows:
"Whenever on trial for a violation of this section the
defendant is shown to have or to have had possession
of the narcotic drug, such possession shall be deemed
sufficient evidence to authorize conviction unless the
defendant explains the possession to the satisfaction of
the jury."201 Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
210 See, e.g., N.Y. PENiAL CODE §1751, which reads in
part:
"Such [illegal] intent is presumptively established by
proof that the person knowingly possessed or had in his
control... one or more preparations, compounds, mix-
tures or substances, of an aggregate weight of [differing
amounts for differing drugs]. This presumption may be
rebutted."
See also, FrA. STAT. ANN. §849.05, which reads in
part:
"if any of the implements, devices or apparatus com-
monly used in games of chance in gambling houses...
are found in any house.., or other place, it shall be
prima facie evidence that said.., place where the same
are found is kept for the purpose of gambling."211 Cf., PA. STAT. Ax. (Purdon) §4605, which reads:
"Whoever, being the owner ... of any premises
leases,... the same,... to be used and occupied...
[for gambling] is guilty of a misdemeanor.
"The owner of such premises who shall have knowl-
edge that any such [gambling] has been set up in or
upon the said premises and shall not forthwith cause
complaint to be made against the person who has set
statute has been enacted which makes ownership
of a federal gambling stamp presumptive evidence
that the stamp holder is violating state gambling
laws. 2
Although this type of statutory presumption is
of considerable assistance in obtaining convictions
against minor functionaries in a criminal organiza-
tion, seldom is it of use against the upper echelon.
Organization leaders avoid the effect of these
statutes by arranging the conduct of their criminal
operations in such a manner that they personally
never indulge in any activities which might trigger
an unfavorable presumption. Thus, these men
ordinarily avoid carrying narcotics or gambling
paraphernalia' on their person, holding legal title
to the premises upon which the organization's
businesses are conducted, and taking out federal
gambling stamps in their own names. Only when
the organization is small or the organization leader
subject to some of the same personal weaknesses
as he himself exploits will a man in control of a
criminal, organization be entwined in circum-
stances which will allow a presumption to operate.
Accordingly; a more sophisticated breed of statu-
tory presumption must be developed before this
will be an effective technique for establishing cases
against the leadership of organized crime.
B. Convicting Management-Level Organization
Menbers for Violation of Laws Not
Directly Related to the Organiza-
tion's Illegal Activities
Confronted with the difficulties inherent in any
attempt to prosecute management-level organiza-
tion members for the acts committed by the or-
ganization, some governments have resorted to
proceeding against these men for infractions of
other laws. The federal government has been
forced to employ this approach for the.additional
reason that most of the activities of organized
up ... same, shall be deemed to have knowingly leased
... the said premises for the said purposes."
212 "The holding, owning, having in possession of, or
paying the tax for a wagering occupational tax stamp
issued by the Internal Revenue authorities of the United
States shall be held in all the courts of this state as
prima facie evidence against the person holding such
stamp in any prosecution of such person for violation of
the Gambling Laws of this state...." FLA. STAT. ANN.
§849.05 (1954). The Florida Supreme Court has held
this statute unconstitutional in its attempt to render the
ownership of a gambling stamp prima fade evidence of a
gambling violation without any independent evidence
of the corpus delecti. Jefferson v. Sweat, 76 So.2d 494
(Fla. 1954).
EARL JOHNSON, JR.
crime are not illegal under federal law.213 Gambling,
prostitution, most forms of racketeering, shy-
locking, and the illegal operation of most legitimate
businesses are enterprises which may be conducted
without breaking any federal laws. Even arson,
assault, murder, and the other violent subsidiary
crimes of the criminal organization usually are
not federal crimes. 214 Consequently, such jurisdic-
tion as the federal government does enjoy in the
area of organized crime is exercised primarily
through prosecuting the men of organized crime
for violations of federal criminal laws not directly
related to the organization's activities.
Tax fraud has been the charge most generally
employed by the federal government in seeking to
send management-level organization members to
federal prisons. This technique affords the federal
prosecutor a broad-spectrum weapon against or-
ganization leaders. As federal taxpayers, the latter
are prosecutable for a wide range of acts and
omissions involving the federal tax laws. They
are liable if they fail to make required returns or
maintain required records2S If they do file but
submit a false return or make a false statement in
documents relevant to their taxes, they violate
tax fraud provisions. 6 A false statement, oral or
211 "While there are some important exceptions, these
activities are for the most part carried on in violation of
state rather than federal law." ABA REPORT ON OR-
GANIZED CRfl ANm LA w EiNtoncsras. 275 (1952).
214 Recent legislation enacted as a part of the At-
torney General's program against organized crime
renders many of these heretofore strictly local infrac-
tions federal crimes if an interstate nexus is present.
This legislation will be discussed in the third install-
ment of this article.
215 "Any person required by this title or by regula-
tions made under authority thereof to make a return,
keep any records, or supply any information, who will-
fully fails to ... make such return, keep such records,
or supply such information, at the time or times re-
quired by law or regulations, shall, in addition to other
penalties provided by law, be guilty of a misdemeanor
and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more
than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or
both, together with the costs of prosecution." 26 U.S.C.
§7203. An organization leader would be susceptible to
prosecution under this section for failure to file a return
even though much of the income to be reported was de-
rived from illegal activities. Cf., Rutkin v. United
States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952). The claim of'self-incrimina-
tion is not available to excuse a failure to file. United
States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927).
216 "Any person who willfully delivers or discloses to
the Secretary or his delegate any list, return, account,
statement, or other document, known by him to be
fraudulent or to be false as to any material matter, shall
be fined not more than $1000, or imprisoned not more
than 1 year, or both." 26 U.S.C. §7207. If the statement
is made under oath or othervise under the penalties of
perjury, the organization leader may be amenable to
felony sanctions.
written, to government agents investigating the
taxpayer's liability can also be a predicate for
prosecution. If evidence can be obtained indi-
cating that they have taken positive steps to
attempt to evade a tax which is due and owing,
they may be prosecuted under a felony section.
2 18
Likewise, willful failure to pay a federal tax2a9
and concealments of assets with intent to defraud
are felonies under existing lawY0 Moreover, the
"Any person who-
"(1) ... Willfully makes and subscribes any return,
statement, or other document, which contains or is
verified by a written declaration that it is made under
the penalties of perjury, and which he does not believe
to be true and correct as to every material matter...
shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof,
shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not
more than 3 years, or both, together with the costs of
prosecution." 26 U.S.C. §7206 (1). Taxpayers have also
been prosecuted under the general perjury (18 U.S.C.
§1621) and false statement (18 U.S.C. §1001) provisions
of the criminal code.
217 These prosecutions have been successfully con-
cluded under both the perjury (18 U.S.C. 1621) and
false statement (18 U.S.C. 1001) statutes. Perjury:
Lasalle v. United States, 155 F.2d 452 (10th Cir. 1946).
False Statement: Cohen v. United States, 201 F.2d
386 (9th Cir. 1953); Knisely v. United States, 200 F.2d
559 (6th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 923; Cf.,
United States v. Silver, 235 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1956).
218 "Any person who willfully attempts in any manner
to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the
payment thereof shall, in addition to other penalties
provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon con-
viction thereof, shall be fined not more than $10,000,
or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, together
with the costs of prosecution." 26 U.S.C. §7201.
The primary elements of this crime are: (1) a tax de-
ficiency, that is, income upon which a tax has not been
paid and which ordinarily has not been reported, see,
United States v. Rosen, 314 U.S. 513 (1941); Rose v.
United States, 128 F.2d 622 (10th Cir. 1942), cert.
denied, 317 U.S. 651; (2) a "willful and positive" at-
tempt to evade payment of this tax deficiency, see
Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492 (1942).
219 "Any person required under this title to collect,
account for, and pay over any tax imposed by this title
who willfully fails to collect or truthfully account for
and pay over such tax shall, in addition to other
penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and,
upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than
$10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both,
together with the costs of prosecution." 26 U.S.C.
§7202.
The primary elements of this crime are: (1) a tax
due and owing; (usually this section would not be
employed unless the taxpayer had fully reported his
taxable income); (2) a willful failure to pay this tax.
See, United States v. Palermo, 152 F. Supp. 825 (E.D.
Pa. 1957), in which the requisite willfulness was
established by the taxpayer's extravagant expenditures
during the period he owed back taxes.
no0 "Any person who-
"(4) ... Removes, deposits, or conceals, or is con-
cerned in removing, depositing, or concealing, any
goods or commodities for or in respect whereof any
tax is or shall be imposed,... with intent to evade or
defeat the assessment or collection of any tax imposed
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government can prosecute an organization, leader
for assisting another to evade the tax.ni Acts
which do not comprise a violation or attempt to
violate any of these substantive sections may be
punishable as part of a conspiracy "to impair,
defeat and obstruct the functions of the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue" by concealing
matters relevant to collection of federal taxes.m
These various offenses are not confined to acts
and omissions in relation to income taxes. An
organization leader can be prosecuted as well for
evasion of excise taxes, social security taxes, or
by this title... shall be guilty of a felony and, upon
conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $5,000,
or imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both, together
with the costs of prosecution." 26 U.S.C. §7206(4).
12 The general accessorial statute (18 U.S.C. §2)
would apply to all of these tax violations. This statute
reads as follows:
"(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United
States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, or
procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.(b) Whoever wilfully causes an act to be done which if
directly performed by him or another would be an
offense against the United States, is punishable as a
principal."
In addition, there is a special section of the revenue
laws punishing certain forms of assistance:
:'Any person who-
" (2) ... Willfully aids or assists in, or procures,
counsels, or advises the preparation or presentation
under, or in connection with any matter arising under,
the internal revenue laws, of a return, affidavit, claim,
or other document, which is fraudulent or is false as
to any material matter, whether or not such falsity or
fraud is with the knowledge or consent of the persons
authorized or required to present such return, affidavit,
claim or document; ... shall be guilty of a felony and,
upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than
$5,000, or imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both,
together with the costs of prosecution." 26 U.S.C.
§7206(2).
2 United States v. Klein, 247 F.2d 908 (2d Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 924; Kobey v. United
States, 208 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1953). These prosecu-
tions were brought under the following language of
the general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. §371:
"If two or more persons conspire.., to defraud the
United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or
for any purpose,... each shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both."
It has been held that the government is not required
to show the existence of a tax deficiency to sustain a
conviction under this charge. The essence of the theory
is not the loss of federal revenues but the impairment
of the Treasury Department's function of collecting
federal taxes. If the acts which are the intended objec-
tive of the conspiracy would render the collection of
such taxes more difficult, participants in the conspiracy
are prosecutable under 18 U.S.C. §371. In Kobey v.
United States, supra, for instance, members of a
gambling organization were convicted for concealing
the gambling operation and destroying certain
records which would have been useful in determining
the amount of taxes owed.
withholding taxes.2 That a business enterprise is
illegal does not exempt the owners from responsi-
bility for collecting and paying over social security
and withholding taxes owed by their employees.n 4
Thus, an organization leader can be prosecuted
for failing to collect and pay over these taxes for
his croupiers, dealers, and other employees in one
of an organization's gambling operations.2s
One factor which has hindered successful
prosecution of organization leaders for federal tax
fraud in recent years is the sophistication acquired
by these individuals in the techniques of successful
tax evasion. They have learned to deal strictly in
cash, to maintain a minimum of records, if any,
to conceal their financial interest in various busi-
nesses through the employment of "front men,"
and to arrange for "stand-up men" who will
explain any unreported funds traced to an or-
ganization leader as money they "loaned" him.
The usual method of establishing a tax evasion
case against organization leaders, despite their
skimpy records, their convenient lapses of memory,
and their multitude of fronts, is the so-called
"net-worth" theory. In presenting such a case, the
government establishes a taxpayer's net worth at
the commencement of the taxing period, 26 deducts
2 A separate section punishes the willful failure to
furnish a statement or the furnishing of a false state-
ment to employees setting forth the taxes withheld
from their earnings.
"In lieu of any other penalty provided by law...
any person required under the provisions of section
6051 [requiring statements of income and F.I.C.A.
taxes withheldl to furnish a statement who willfully
furnishes a false or fraudulent statement or who will-
fully fails to furnish a statement in the manner, at'
the time, and showing the information required under
section 6051 [i.e., names of the employer and employee,
amount of wages, amount of taxes withheld], or regula-
tions prescribed thereunder, shall for each such offense,
upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $1,000,
or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both." 26
U.S.C. §7204.
n4 Kobey v. United States, 208 F.2d 583 (9th Cir.
1953).
2, "As part of their argument..., the appellants
... assert that 'Illegal businesses are not within the
purview of the Social Security Act.'
"There is no suggestion [in the relevant provision of
the Internal Revenue Code] that the employment
must be lawful. As we have seen, to be taxable, wages
need not be derived from legitimate employment.
"It is asserted also that under California law,
contracts of bookmakers with their employees are
'illegal, void and unenforceable.' It is unquestionable
that the validity of California contracts should be
tested under California law; but the Federal taxability
of the proceeds from such contracts is a matter of
Federal law." 208 F.2d at 596-97.
226 This beginning net worth position must be estab-
lished with substantial accuracy. United States v.
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that from his net worth at the end of the period,
and proves that the net gain in net worth exceeds
the income reported by the taxpayer. The judge
or jury is then entitled to draw the inference that
the defendant has not reported his entire income.2
It has been held that the government does not
have to show a probable source of the excess un-
reported gain in net worth, if it can negate the
probability that the gain was derived from non-
taxable sources.m
The tax fraud weapon has yielded some spectacu-
lar successes, the most notable of which undoubt-
edly was the final victory over Al Capone. The very
success of the approach has in recent years, how-
ever, greatly reduced its effectiveness. Impressed
by the resourcefulness and relative incorruptibility
of federal law enforcement officials, management-
level organization members have begun scrupu-
lously to report all income, or at least all that they
spend.22 9 The gross evasions of the Capone era
are a thing of the past, and these cases have be-
come more difficult to prosecute successfully 0
The federal government is now often required to
Achilli, 234 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1956). The proof of this
vital element usually is the most difficult aspect of a
"net worth" case. It can be established, inter alia,
through admissions made by the taxpayer, Smith v.
United States, 348 U.S. 147 (1954), affirming, 210 F.2d
496 (1st Cir.), a prior bankruptcy judgment, United
States v. Vassallo, 181 F.2d 1006 (3rd Cir. 1950),
financial statements submitted to lending institutions
by the taxpayer, Friedberg v. United States, 348 U.S.
142 (1954), and the work sheets of the taxpayer's
accountant, Falsone v. United States 205 F.2d 734 (5th
Cir. 1953).
This theory of proof has been universally upheld.
Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954); United
States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503 (1942).
218 United States v. Ford, 237 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1956);
United States v. Adonis, 221 F.2d 717 (3d Cir. 1955).
Contra, Massei v. United States, 241 F.2d 895 (1st Cir.
1957).
Conversely, proof of a probable taxable source of
the excess increase in net worth creates a presumption
that the net increase did not derive from non-taxable
sources. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954);
Jelaza v. United States, 179 F.2d 202 (4th Cir. 1950)'
229 "The mafiosi had also learned four principles
from the Capone era... 1. Always have a good lawyer.
2. Never plot or carry out violence against a federal
officer. 3. Pay federal income taxes.. 4. Never trust
anyone except a Sicilian mafioso." SoNDERN, BRoxHE-
HOOD OF EvIL: THE MAxIA 69 (1959). (Emphasis
supplied.)
280 A set of laws designed to tighten the tax enforce-
ment provisions and thereby improve tax evasion as a
weapon against organized crime was recommended
by the Kefauver Committee upon completion of its
much publicized investigation into organized crime in
America. There were S. 1529, S. 1531, S. 1532, and
S. 1660, all in the 82nd Congress. These bills are sum-
marized and evaluated in ABA REPORT ON ORGANIZED
CR AND LAW ENTORCEMENT 48-53 (1952).
prosecute management-level organization members
for minor infractions of the tax laws for which
ordinary taxpayers would never be hailed into
court.
2 31
In addition to tax fraud prosecutions, another
technique utilized by the federal government
which implements this same general approach is
to seek deportation of management-level organiza-
tion members of foreign birth. In the usual situa-
tion, use of the deportation device means a federal
sanction-expulsion from the country-is applied
for past violations of state laws, although, of
course, deportation can be based upon conviction
of a federal crime as well.22 2 Inasmuch as an or-
ganization member generally does not achieve
immunity from local prosecution even in the most
corrupt cities until he has reached a certain level
in the organization, the early careers of many
current organization leaders are marked by arrests
and convictions of state crimes. The federal govern-
ment, by a close perusal of the prior histories of
foreign-born organization leaders, has been able
to reach back into their more vulnerable days as
apprentice hoodlums and to convert these past
convictions into present-day deportation from
the country.
Deportation as a legal weapon is not available
against all organization leaders, of course. Absent
unusual circumstances, a person who was born an
American citizen cannot be deported no matter
how heinous the crimes he commits. 3 1Moreover,
a person of foreign birth who attains American
citizenship through naturalization cannot be
deported unless and until stripped of that citizen-
ship in a denaturalization proceeding. Thus, the
expulsion of a foreign-born organization leader who
has become a citizen must be accomplished in two
steps, denaturalization, then deportation.2 4
Of the two processes, denaturalization is the
more difficult. Crimes or other disreputable con-
duct occurring subsequent to the attainment of
citizenship cannot justify denaturalization. The
231 See, e.g., United States v. Accardo, 298 F.2d 133
(7th Cir. 1962).
212 Buffalino v. Irvine, 103 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1939);
Ponzi v. Ward, 7 F.Supp. 736 (D. Mass. 1934).
2q Title 8 U.S.C. §1101 (a) (3) defines the class of
persons who are amenable to deportation as "Any
person not a citizen or national of the United States
." See Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149 (1923).
2 Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 521 (1950).
However, deportations can be sought on the basis of
acts committed while a citizen as long as at the time
of the deportation hearing the defendant has been
denaturalized. Rabaug v. Boyd, 353 U.S. 427 (1957).
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sole ground for denaturalization is fraud in the
procurement of the certificate of nataralization.
To succeed the government must prove conceal-
ment or wilful misrepresentation of a material
fact in obtaining citizenship.u5 A wide range of
matters have been held material to the procure-
ment of United States citizenship, concealment of
which will justify loss of citizenship in a denaturali-
zation action. Among these are: (1) prior arrests
of the applicant;2 6 (2) his prior convictions;
(3) the applicant's name;m (4) his marital status
at the time of naturalization; 9 (5) his employment
at the time of naturalization; 4' (6) whether the
nature of his original entry into the coimtry was
legal or illegal;24' (7) any conduct which might
reflect upon his moral character,2 4 2 such as acts of
-5 "It shall be the duty of the United States at-
torneys for the respective districts, upon affidavit
showing good cause therefore to institute proceedings
... for the purpose of revoking and setting aside the
order admitting such person to citizenship and can-
celing the certificate of naturalization on the ground
that such order and certificate of naturalization were
procured by concealment of a material fact or by willfid
misrepresentation...." 8 U.S.C. §1451(a). See also, 8
U.S.C. §1451(g), which provides for automatic revoca-
tion of citizenship by the trial court upon conviction
for violation of 18 U.S.C. §1425 (procurement of
naturalization in violation of law). The government
has the burden of proof and must establish the grounds
for revocation by dear, unequivocal and convincing
evidence which does not leave the issue in doubt."
Nowak v. United States, 356 U.S. 660 (1958).
"' Chaunt v. United States, 270 F.2d 179 (9th Cir.
1959), reversed, 364 U. S. 350 (1960) (arrests not of
type to support denaturalization).
2 United States v. Bridges, 90 F. Supp. 973 (N.D.
Cal. 1950). Failing to disclose a conviction is grounds
for denaturalization even if the crime involved would
not warrant deportation. United States v. De Francis,
50 F.2d 497 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
2- United States v. DeLucia, 163 F. Supp. 36
(N.D. Il. 1957), aff'd, 256 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 836 (1958).
239 Lumantes v. United States, 232 F.2d 216 (9th
Cir. 1956).
210Uited States v. Costello, 171 -F. Supp. 10
(S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd, 275 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 973. In this case, Frank Costello, re-
puted leader of the New York criminal organization;
was denaturalized on the grounds that he failed to reveal
the fact that his occupation was "bootlegger" when he
made application for citizenship.2
1
1 United States v. Shapiro, 43 F. Supp. 927 (S.D.
Cal. 1942); United States v. Anastasio, 120 F.Supp.
435 (D. N. J. 1954), rev. on other grnds, 226 F.2d 912
(3d Cir. 1955), cert. den. 351 U.S. 931.
m Conduct consistent with good moral character
during the five year period of residence required prior
to citizenship is material because it is one of the
statutory prerequisites to granting citizenship to an
alien. 8 U.S.C. §1427(a) (3).
adultery,n association with prostitutes,24' and
even divorce.4 5 The federal government has
been able to uncover lies or concealment in regard
to such material facts by a substantial number of
naturalized organization leaders and thereby
strip them of the immunity from deportation which
is enjoyed by all American citizens.
After an organization leader has been reduced
to the status of an alien through a denaturalization
proceeding or in case investigation reveals that he
never became an American citizen, the next step in
the government's strategem is to initiate a de-
portation action against him."' To accomplish
this objective the government generally must show
that the organization leader committed certain
criminal acts either before entering this country or
subsequent to taking residence here.247 If the
proof is of criminal conduct prior to entry, it is
sufficient to show either a single offense "involving
moral turpitude"2"4 or two convictions not neces-
sarily involving moral turpitude but which carry
an aggregate penalty of five years imprisonment.24
If the government is relying on conduct occurring
subsequent to entering the country, it must estab-
lish that the organization leader was convicted of
241 United States v. Cloutier, 87 F.Supp. 848 (E.D.
Mich. 1949).
24 United States v. Raverat, 222 Fed. 1018 (D.
Mont. 1915);
24 United States v. Forrest, 69 F. Supp. 389 (D.R.L
1946).
216 For an excellent delineation of the constitutional
perimeter within which the federal government's
power to deport must be exercised, see Note, Constitu-
tional Status of the Lawfully Admitted Permanent
Resident Alien: The Inherent Limits of the Power to
Expd, 69 YAc L.J. 262 (1959).
m 8 U.S.C. §1251(a) (1) renders persons deportable
who were excludable at the time of their entry. Also
deportable are aliens guilty of communist activities,
8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f)(g)(h), any alien who
has used fraud in procuring a visa or other document
in entering the United States, 8 U.S.C. §1182 (a)919,
and any alien who fails to comply with the alien
registration provisions, 8 U.S.C. §1251(a)(5).
2488 U.S.C. §1182(a)(9), makes persons committing
the prescribed offense or offenses excludable. Under
this section, it is not necessary that the government
produce a record of a conviction for the crime alleged.
It is sufficient if the government produces evidence
that the defendant committed acts which fulfill the
elements of a "crime involving moral turpitude." See
Note, Deportation Based on Criminality Before Entry,
1 Cryv. MAR. L. Rtv. 22 (1952).
29 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(10). This section requires proof
that the defendant was convicted of two or more
offenses "regardless of whether the conviction was in
a single trial or whether the offenses arose from a
single scheme of misconduct and regardless of whether
the offenses involved moral turpitude, for which the
aggregate sentences to confinement actually imposed
were five years or more."
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a single crime "involving moral turpitude" within
five years of entry or else at any time after entry
was convicted of two such crimes.ns
Thus, deportation is a technique which requires
a thorough investigation of the organization
leader's personal history both before and after
his entry into this counitry. In most cases, this in-
vestigation must yield evidence of a crime "in-
volving moral turpitude" if deportation is to be
effected .25 In the context of the deportation pro-
visions, this category has been held to embrace a
broad range of criminal activity including
murder,4 2 extortion,m arson,24 bribery,2 15 per-
jury, 15 and tax evasion.8 2 In addition, participa-
tion in certain fields of criminal activity has been
made grounds for deportation in special statutes
thus obviating the requirement of a judicial finding
that the activity "involves moral turpitude."
Among these are several in which an organization
leader might become embroiled such as prostitu-
tion,253 the narcotics traffic, 59 and the possession
250 8 U.S.C. §1251(a) (4). According to this section, an
alien is deportable if he "is convicted of a crime involv-
ing moral turpitude committed within five years after
entry and either sentenced to confinement or confined
therefor in a prison or corrective institution, for a
year or more, or who at any time after entry is con-
victed of two crimes involving moral turpitude, not
arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct,
regardless of whether confined therefor and regardless
of whether the convictions were in a single trial."
261 Virtually the only exception is if the alien com-
mitted two or more crimes of any description prior to
entry which resulted in the imposition of an aggregate
sentence exceeding five years. In such a case it is not
necessary the crimes be ones "involving moral turpi-
tude." See note 249, supra, and accompanying text.
2
52 Allessio v. Day, 42 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1930).
Voluntary manslaughter has also been held to be a
"crime involving moral turpitude." Pillisz v. Smith,
46 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1931). However, involuntary
manslaughter does not carry this undesirable connota-
tion and will not justify deportation. Tutrone v.
Shaughnessy, 160 F. Supp. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1958);
Matter of R, 5 I. & N. Dec. 463 (1953).
253 Matter of GT, 4 I. & N. Dec. 446 (1951); Matter
of F, 3 I. & N. Dec. 361 (1949).
254 Johnson v. Pepe, 28 F.2d 810 (2d Cir. 1928).
255 Matter of V, 4 I. & N. Dec. 100 (1950).
258 Alvares y Flores v. Savoretti, 205 F.2d 544 (5th
Cir. 1953); United States ex rel. Karpay v. Uhl, 70 F.2d
792 (2d Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 573.
257 Khan v. Barber, 253 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 357 U.S. 920; Chu v. Cornell, 247 F.2d 929
(9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 892. See, Note,
Federal Income Tax Evasion Defined as Crime Involving
Moral Turpitude, 25 GEo. WASH. L. Rxv. 711 (1957).
258 Involvement in prostitution as a grounds for
deportation is the subject of a special statutory section,
8 U.S.C. §1251(a)(12). It requires only proof of com-
mission of the proscribed acts, not conviction of a
crime, and applies not only to the prostitutes them-"
selves, but to other functionaries in that type of enter-
of sub-machine guns and sawed-off shotguns.11
On the other hand, several types of criminal ac-
tivity which are typical of organization operations
have been held insufficient as a predicate for de-
portation. These include professional gambling,8 '
bootlegging,2 2 and loan sharking.20
That the deportation of management-level or-
ganization members does not always curtail their
influence in or usefulness to organized crime is
attested to by the career of Charles "Lucky"
Luciano, who until his recent death purportedly
directed the world-wide narcotics traffic, most of it
destined for the United States, from Italy where
he was deported after World War 11.2 64 Deporta-
tion is also subject to the limitation that it is
available only against foreign-born organization
members, an element which is naturally becoming
less numerous in criminal organizations as it is in
the nation as a whole.
65
Possibly because they have other grounds for
prise, such as procurers, Spadaro v. Nabon, 229 F.2d
190 (5th Cir. 1956), managers, Ranieri v. Smith, 49
F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 657, and
persons supported by, or receiving the proceeds of
prostitution, Matter of G, 5 I. & N. Dec. 559 (1954).
The latter category is the one into which an organiza-
tion leader often might fall.
259 A special section makes any alien deportable who
"is ... a narcotic drug addict, or who... has been
convicted of a violation of, or a conspiracy to violate,
any law or regulation relating to the illicit possession
of or traffic in narcotic drugs.... ." This section was
held to apply to violations which occurred prior to the
enactment of this statute in Marcello v. Bondi, 349
U.S. 302 (1955), the case which resulted in an as yet
unexecuted deportation order against Carlos Marcello,
the reputed king-pin of organized crime in New Or-
leans. For a general discussion of this section see Note,
Deportability of Alien Narcotics Offender, 39 Mn. L.
REv. 229 (1955).
260 Congress also has seen fit to enact specie' legisla-
tion in regard to deportation for the possession of
machine guns or sawed-off shotguns. See 8 U.S.C.
§1251(a) (14).
261 United States v. Carrollo, 30 F. Supp. 3 (W.D.
Mo. 1939); Matter of G, 1 I. & N. Dec. 59 (1941).
262 Iorio v. Day, 34 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1929).
23 Matter of B, 6 I. & N. Dec. 98 (1954).
264 For an account of Mr. Luciano's speckled career,
see SONDERN, op. cit. supra note 229, at 85-104.
2 The Kefauver Committee recommended two
amendments to the immigration laws which were
aimed at making immigration enforcement a more
effective weapon against organized crime. S. 1662, 82nd
Congress, would allow the Attorney General to cancel
suspension of deportation on the basis of after-dis-
covered evidence as to the criminality or other relevant
consideration rendering the prior suspension of deporta-
tion unwarranted. S. 1661, 82nd Congress, would
punish persons who harbor or conceal illegally entered
aliens. This proposed legislation is summarized and
evaluated in ABA REPORT, op. cit. supra note 213,
at 56-57.
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exercising jurisdiction over organized crime, state
governments generally have not made extensive
use of this indirect approach to convicting manage-
ment level organization members. There would
probably be no lack of opportunity for a state
prosecuting authority so disposed. The statute
books of most states and the ordinances of most
cities are replete with archaic laws at least one of
which most citizens violate at some time or other
each day; and obviously members of criminal or-
ganizations are no more virtuous than most other
citizens. If such men were kept under constant
surveillance it probably would be possible to bring
a series of charges against them that would keep
them in court most days that they were not in
jail serving sentences for their violation of these
laws.26
As an example of potential uses of this technique,
among these oft-broken laws are the fornication
statutes which are still in the criminal codes of most
states. 267 Most persons claiming any knowledge of
the private lives and habits of management-level
organization members state that these men almost
invariably insure the happiness of their home life
by maintaining and making use of a mistress. This
means not merely casual fornication, but frequent,
reliable and presumably easily detected fornication.
Rigorous enforcement of the fornication statutes
against management-level members of the criminal
organization would probably yield two forseeable
results. First, these men would become monoga-
mous after a few of their cohorts had been sent to
prison for not being. Second, the fornication
216 In late 1961, Chicago law enforcement officials
initiated a crackdown on the personal traffic offenses
committed by organization leaders.
"The lineup in Traffic Court Wednesday looked
like 'Hood's Who.'
"Two bigtime hoodlums, plus some associates were
up on minor traffic charges.
"They were hauled into court as part of a renewed
police effort to make them uneasy in Chicago.
"Some of the tickets dated back to 1952." Chicago
Daily News, Dec. 27, 1961, p. 6.
Although not calculated to inflict any lasting injury
on organized crime, this effort does illustrate the
potential of the approach of prosecuting top racketeers
for their own personal infractions of the law rather
than through the crimes of the organization.
"17 As evidence of the seeming imperishability of
such statutes despite widespread disobedience and
general neglect of enforcement, consider the most
recent draft of a new and progressive criminal code in
America-the one recently enacted by the Illinois
legislature. Section 11-8 defines and punishes the crime
of fornication. See ILL. REv. Clus. CODE of 1961,
11-8. Puritanism evidently will never be purged from
ouir nation's criminal laws.
statutes might very well be repealed when the
public was made fully aware of their existence
and meaning. Thus, as a technique for ridding
ourselves of some archaic criminal laws, as well as
for imprisoning important members of organized
crime, this approach has much to recommend it.
Also often overlooked by many local authorities
in their efforts to convict organization leaders are
their own state criminal tax fraud laws. Some states
in which organized crime is most powerful derive
a part of their revenues from state income taxes.
Further, compliance with these laws is often
enforced through criminal sanctions. 263 Any failure
to report and pay all taxes due on his total income
will render an organization leader amenable to
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, in these states
local law enforcement has available the same
weapon which the federal government has found
most effective in obtaining convictions against
the leadership of organized crime.
C. Evaluation of the Approach of Convicting
Management-Level Organization Members
It is a common error to believe that the im-
prisonment of management-level members of the
criminal organization is the ultimate solution to
the problem of organized crime. It is not.
A criminal organization is a viable and resilient
social organism. Capone was sent to prison, but
the Chicago organization he once headed was for a
long time thereafter much more prosperous than
it was in his heyday. Nitti committed suicide, and
yet it prospered. Accardo could go to prison, but
the organization he formerly headed would scarcely
miss him. The plain truth is that management-level
organization members, like their underlings, and
for that matter, like corporation executives, are
replaceable. For every "president" of a criminal
organization sent to prison, there are several
"vice-presidents" able and eager to take over.
Even in the improbable event that law enforce-
ment agencies were able simultaneously to convict
the entire "management" of a criminal organiza-
tion, the organization probably would not die.
As long as there was money in the treasury, some
of the organization's facilities still intact, and some
of its enterprises yet in operation, lower echelon
organization members probably would move up to
take the reins of control of the neglected empire.
Admittedly, however, such a simultaneous con-
218 See, e.g., the tax evasion provisions of the New
York Penal Code:
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viction of all or substantially all of the organiza-
tion's management personnel would be the most
crippling single blow that could be administered
to a criminal organization. Given a proper
follow-up by law enforcement officials, it might
even eventuate in the death of the organization.
A proper follow-up would entail the closing down
of all the enterprises of the organization, and
prompt action against any would-be successors to
the imprisoned management team.
Admitting the great impact which a simultane-
ous imprisonment of the entire management of a
criminal organization would have, the likelihood
of such an event taking place is very slim. It is
more important therefore to appraise the effects
which isolated convictions of one or two manage-
ment-level members of a given criminal organiza-
tion can be expected to produce.
One possible consequence, which is unfortunate
when it does result, is a general relaxation of
tension in a previously aroused public which may
accompany the successful prosecution of a leading
figure in organized crime. The public too easily
identifies the threat of organized crime with its
leading members. When a Capone, a Costello, or
an Accardo gets his "comeuppance," the citizenry
may believe that the threat to their community
which they so vividly recognized before has gone
to prison along with the chief villain, and their
interest in the subject can subside. If this were a
necessary concommitant of the process of con-
victing management-level organization members,
it probably would be better not to prosecute them
unless a mass conviction of the entire management
were indeed feasible. It is to be hoped that the
public is now sufficiently sophisticated concerning
the nature of organized crime to know that the
conviction of one or two men, no matter how
infamous, does not bring an end to a criminal
organization.
On the other side of the ledger, there are col-
lateral advantages to be gained by imprigoning
management-level organization members, aside
from any momentary dislocations it might create
"A person, who, in making any statement, oral or
written, which is required or authorized by law to be
made as the basis of imposing any tax or assessment,
or of any application to reduce any tax or assessment,
willfully makes, as to any material matter any state-
ment which he knows to be false, is guilty of a mis-
demeanor." N.Y. PENAL CODE §2321.
"A person who willfully obstructs or hinders a
public officer from collecting any... taxes ... and
which such officer is by law empowered to collect, is
guilty of a misdemeanor." N.Y. PENAL CODE §1870.
in the power structure of the organization. For one
thing, it reaffirms the basic tenet of every demo-
cratic society that no one is above the law. The
denial of this tenet is, as discussed in the first
installment of this article, 6 9 one of the real evils of
organized crime. To the degree that government is
able ultimately to mete out appropriate punish-
ment to the scions of organized crime, it reassures
the law-abiding and warns the potential law
breaker. To the extent that government fails in
this mission, it breaks faith with its citizens, under-
mines moral standards and courts eventual
disaster.
Another beneficial result which would follow any
consistent success in convicting management-level
organization members is the long-run deterrent
effect it would probably have on other members of
the organization. If the risk of imprisonment were
very great for management-level members, there
might be great reluctance on the part of many to
rise to such positions within the organization. The
nature of organized crime is such that it is very
difficult to remain anonymous, especially as a
member rises to positions of importance in the
organization. In addition, it is not the type of
criminal attivity in which the criminal can make a
few secretive hit-and-run sorties and hope to retire.
It is essentially a continuous, fairly open life of
criminal activity. If punishment were indeed being
meted out to substantial numbers of management-
level organization members, it would bedifficult
for a member to be convinced that he would be
able to elude prosecution. Unfortunately, the
combined efforts of state and federal authorities
have left too large a percentage of these men un-
souched to cause serious concern to the member-
thip of most criminal organizations. The size of
the rewards still outweighs the slim risks.
II. INFLICTING ECONOMIC LOSSES ON THE ILLEGAL
ENTERPRISES OF ORGANIZED CRIME
Important as conviction of organization leaders
may be in any drive against organized crime, it is
not the exclusive nor the ultimate approach to the
containment of a criminal organization. Organized
crime is engaged in many businesses. Some of these
businesses are illegal in themselves. Others are
legal businesses which the organization operates
in an illegal manner. The latter category includes
vending machine leasing, laundry services, labor
269 See part I of this series, 53 J. C=uM. L., C. &
P.S. 399, at 414-15 (1962).
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unions, and the selling of various commodities.
Since these are legitimate businesses, it is im-
possible for law enforcement agencies to attempt to
suppress the businesses themselves. However,
gambling, prostitution, shylocking, and narcotics
peddling are all illegal businesses. Consequently,
action which will make these businesses less profit-
able or more difficult to conduct is permissible. It
is not surprising to find that one of the legal ap-
proaches most frequently employed against or-
ganized crime is to seek to render its illegal
businesses unprofitable. Like ordinary legitimate
concerns, organized crime is in business to make
money. And as they would to a legitimate concern,
sustained financial losses can spell ruin to organized
crime.
In general, three methods have received fairly
wide use in attempting to cause financial loss to the
illegal enterprises of organized crime. First, and
potentially the most effective of these methods, is
confiscation. This includes the confiscation of
illegal consumer goods, physical objects which are
used to conduct illegal businesses, and money in-
volved in illegal transactions. The second method
is to close the premises on which illegal businesses
are conducted through public nuisance actions or
the revocation of essential licenses. A third method
would be to impose and collect heavy taxes from
illegal businesses.
A. Confiscation
The technique of confiscation is as broad or
narrow, as useful or useless, as the legislature by
statute wishes to make it.27° Given a broad enough
statute and conscientious law enforcement officers,
certain organization businesses would be impossible
to operate at a profit, and a serious crimp would be
put in the conduct of others. Although the un-
touchable Eliot Ness did very few .of the things
attributed to him in a weekly television drama,2n
he did administer the first setback suffered by the
Capone syndicate through leading a series of spec-
tacular raids in which millions of gallons of illegal
210 At the common law, certain articles are subject to
confiscation as contraband. The theory is that pos-
session of these articles is illegal, leading to the con-
clusion that the court cannot properly direct return of
such articles, since to do so would make the recipient a
criminal. State v. Ditmar, 132 Wash. 501, 232 Pac. 321
(1925); State v. Keeler, 105 Wis. 175, 236 N.W. 561
(1931); 37 C.J.S. Forfeitures §3 (1939).
27 "The Untouchables," ABC-TV.
liquor and much valuable equipment were
confiscated and destroyed. 2
Confiscation involves the seizure and retention
by the government of physical objects and money
which in one way or another are employed by the
criminal organization in the conduct of its illegal
businesses.m The objects subject to confiscation
can include illegal consumer products, such as
narcotics; 74 the machinery utilized to produce the
illegal goods, such as stills 5; devices used in dis-
pensing illegal services, such as slot machines;-2 6
the vehicles employed in transporting other illegal
objects, such as automobiles used for smuggling
narcotics;W and the fixtures found on premises
used for the conduct of illegal businesses, such as
the plush fittings of a gambling casino.m Confisca-
tion of money has been authorized by some states
when it is found inside slot machines,79 on poker
tables,70 or within- premises employed for illegal
purposes.2 1 This weapon probably could be sharp-
ened considerably by broadening the statute to
permit confiscation of any funds traceable to an
illegal business.
A forfeiture proceeding is a civil action. Ac-
cordingly, the government must establish the
272 "The operation most -immediately successful,
which dug the pit for Capone's eventual destruction,
was the drying up of his sources of supply. Elliot Ness,
a brilliant Justice Department agent with a small but
relentless squad... crashed into more than 30 big
plants and warehouses, destroyed millions of dollars
worth of irreplaceable equipment and impounded no
less than 50 big trucks-a large part of the syndicate
life line." SONDERN, op. cit. supra note 229, at 65-66.2
3 For a summary of the statutes and cases in this
area, see Annotation, 3 A.L.R. 2d 738.
27 See 21 U.S.C. §184 (1958).275 See 26 U.S.C.A. §5671 (1963 Supp.); 26 U.S.C.
§7302 (1958).
276 See,, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. §342 (1959); PA. STAT.
AzNN. (Purdon's) §14444; FLA. STAT. AN. §849.232 et.
seq.
277 See 49 U.S.C.A. §782 (1951).
28 See MODEL ANTI-GAmBLING AcT §4(3), ABA
REPORT, op. cit. supra note 213, at 78.
0' Moore v. Brett, 193 Okla. 627, 137 P.2d 539
(1943); State v..McNichols, 63 Idaho 100, 117 P.2d
468 (1941); Germania Club v. City of Chicago, 332
Ill. App. 112, 74 N.E.2d 29 (1947).280Krug v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 3 N.J.
Super. 22, 65 A.2d 542 (App. Div. 1949); Fairmount
Engines Co. v. Montgomery County. 135 Pa. Super.
367, 5 A.2d 419 (1939).
281 Commonwealth v. Deavenport, 45 A.2d 405, 158
Pa. Super. 359 (1946); Connelly v. Weber, 182 Pa.
Super. 187, 126 A.2d 474 (1956). For discussion of
the power of the state to confiscate money found in
slot machines or otherwise in and around gambling
establishments, see notes in 40 CALis. L. REv. 147(1952); 3 HASTINGS L. REv. 157 (1952); 6 MIAm L. Q.
133 (1951); 31 NEB. L. REv. 115 (1951); 4 STAiruoRD
L. Rev. 145 (1951).
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illegal use of the property only by evidence meeting
the civil standard of a preponderance of the evi-
dence, rather than the criminal standard of beyond
a reasonable doubt.n2 In most statesm and in the
federal jurisdictionz4 property is subject to con-
fiscation and forfeiture even though it was
discovered and brought under governmental
control during an illegal search and seizure.
Although the property thus seized will be sup-
pressed from use as evidence in a criminal pros-
ecution, the court will refrain from ordering
its return to the former owners, inasmuch as the
illegal use of the property has rendered the prop-
erty forfeit to the state. A dual rationale has been
offered in support of this prevalent policy-first,
the property no longer belongs to the persons who
used it in the commission of a crime, but rather
belongs to the state, and second, property which
has been used in violation of the law should not
be returned to those who have thus used it so that
it can again be utilized against society. In contrast,
however, in most jurisdictions, physical objects
obtained during an illegal search and seizure are
inadmissible as evidence in forfeiture pro-
ceedings.u 5 Accordingly, in order to procure a
forfeiture of illegally used contraband, it is neces-
sary that the government have sufficient inde-
pendent evidence to establish that the seized prop-
erty was being used in the commission of a crime.
The financial loss which would be suffered by a
given criminal organization during a sustained
series of gambling raids, each culminating in the
confiscation of all gambling devices, all fixtures,
2 The Palmyra, 12 Wheat (25 U.S.) 1 (1827). In
many jurisdictions because of the different standards
of proof applicable in the two proceedings, an acquittal
in a criminal proceeding will not bar forfeiture of seized
property in a subsequent forfeiture proceeding. United
States v. Western Oleomargarine Co., 240 Fed. 235(D. Colo. 1916); Micks v. Mason, 145 Mich. 212,
108 N.W. 707 (1906); Commonwealth v. Certain
Confiscated Liquors, 91 Pa. Super. 165, appeal dismissed,
291 Pa. 357, 140 Atl. 128 (1928).
2 "It is a general rule that contraband, or property
the possession of which is illegal, cannot be returned
to accused from whom it was unlawfully taken, since
that would make him a criminal when he became
repossessed of it." 79 C.J.S., Searches and Seizures
§92.
24 "Property seized through an illegal search and
seizure is subject to forfeiture." United States v. Macri,
185 F. Supp. 144,150 (D. Conn. 1960). Accord, Trupiano
v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948); United States v.
Carey, 272 F.2d 492 (5th Cir. 1959); Welsh v. United
States, 220 F.2d 200 (D.C. Cir. 1955); United States v.
Eight Boxes, 105 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1939).
265 See, e.g., United States v. 673 Cases of Distilled
Spirits and Wines, 74 F. Supp. 622 (D. Minn. 1947).
and all money on the premises could reach propor-
tions disastrous to its gambling operations. Of
all the illegal businesses in which organized crime
engages, gambling is probably the one most sus-
ceptible to this technique. And since gambling is
the major single source of organization income, a
concerted use of this technique against an or-
ganization's gambling enterprises could place the
entire organization in difficult economic straits.
B. Closing Premises on Which Illegal Enterprises
are Conducted
A second technique for causing economic injury
to organized crime is to dose the premises upon
which its illegal businesses are conducted. Since
an organization normally will be able to obtain
new premises for the continuation of the illegal
enterprise formerly conducted at the dosed
premises, only a temporary loss of facilities is
usually involved in such a closing. But the or-
ganization will sustain certain permanent losses of
reyenue and incur additional costs. The organiza-
tion will lose permanently whatever income would
have been earned at the old premises from the time
of its closing until new premises are located and
opened. It may also lose rent monies or other pay-
ments already made on a lease or similar arrange-
ment, or any premium paid if the organization
purchased the premises outright.
The two methods available for dosing premises
devoted to the operation of illegal businesses are
public nuisance actions 6 and license revocalions.m
At the common law, and in some states under
special statutes, gambling houses and houses of
prostitution, for example, may be enjoined as
public nuisances.m The usual injunction merely
prohibits future similar illegal conduct on the
2 6 For discussion of this technique, see Baker, An
Equitable Remedy to Combat Gambling in Illinois, 28
Cm-KENT L. REv. 287 (1950); Note, Equitable Devicesfor Controlling Organized Vice, 48 J. Cans. L., C. &
P.S. 623 (1958).
217 For a discussion of this technique, see Gaynor,
Indirect Control of Organized Crime Through Liquor
License Procedure, 49 J. Crua. L., C. & P.S. 65 (1958).
288 Premises used for purposes of gambling or prostitu-
tion are nuisances per se at the common law. United
States v. Dixon, 25 Fed. Cas. 872, No. 14, 970(C.C.D.C. 1830); Vandeworker v. State, 13 Ark.
700 (1850). States having statutes authorizing injunc-
tions against premises upon which certain illegal acts
are committed include the following: CAL. PEN. Code§11225 (1960) (houses of prostitution); ME. Rzv.
STAT. ch. 141, §1 (1959) (gambling, prostitution and
illegal sale of liquor); TEx. Rxv. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 4665, 4667 (1960) (gambling and prostitution).
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enjoined premises.289 The statutes of some states
permit a broader decree-one dosing the guilty
premises for all purposes for one year and en-
joining the persons involved in the illegal business
from engaging in similar conduct anywhere within
the court's jurisdiction.m Rigorous enforcement
of such a statute would have the secondary effect
of making landlords wary of renting to the or-
ganization or of permitting illegal businesses to
continue operating on their property.
The revocation of essential licenses, normally
liquor licenses, held by premises on which some
illegal organization business is being operated
likewise has the usual result of a financial loss to
the organization. If the organization has a share
in the licensed business, as it often will have, it
suffers the loss of revenue attendant on the dosing
of that business. In addition, there is the cost of
acquiring new licensed premises or space in
another's licensed premises. Again, rigorous en-
forcement of such a law would make other owners
of licensed premises veXr eluctant to allow an or-
ganization's illegal operations to take place upon
their premises. In many states revocation of liquor
licenses can be accomplished summarily by an
execfitive officer without judicial proceedings.2 91
An appeal of the revocation order to the executive
or an administrative body is typically provided. 22
The rationale of statutes permitting summary
revocation is that a liquor license is a privilege
rather than a property right and can be revoked
or denied without complying with the requirements
of due process.n 3
2s9 State v. Denny's Place, 98 Ohio App. 351, 129
N.E.2d 532 (1954); Brindle v. Copeland, 89 S.E. 332
(Ga. 1916); Balch v. State ex rd. Grigsby, 65 Okla. 146,
164 Pac. 776 (1917). In the absence of a liberalizing
statute, such injunctions are subject to the further limi-
tation that they may not encompass suppliers of essen-
tial services to the enjoined premises. People v. Fritz,
316 III. App. 217, 45 N.E.2d 48 (1942); State v. Dick
and Bros. Quincy Brewing Co., 270 Mo. 100, 192 S.W.
1022 (1917).
210 E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 100 2, §§2, 3 (1960).
291 KA_. GEN. STAT. §41-311 (g) (1958); N.Y.
AT.coouc BEVERAGE CONTROL LAW §106; Wis.
STAT. ANN. 175, 90 (1) (1959).
21.2 See, e.g., I.. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, §149, which
authorizes the local liquor control commissioner to
revoke a retail license, and ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43,
§153, which authorizes an appeal from such an order
to the state liquor control commission.
293 Darling Apartment Co. v. Springer, 22 A.2d 397
(Del. 1941); Fitzpatrick v. Liquor Control Commission,
316 Mich. 83, 25 N.W.2d 118 (1946); Blum v. Ford,
104Ark. 393,107 S.W.2d 340 (1937); People v. McBride,
234 11). 146, 84 N.E. 865 (1908).
C. Spicial Taxes on Revenue From Illegal Businesses
"The power to tax is the power to destroy."
This, one of the most trite phrases heard in present
day political discussions, is usually the cry of
alarmists who fear that we may unintentionally
destroy the object of our taxation through over-
taxing. But what of the use of taxes to intentionally
destroy undesirable economic entities? This is a
technique for fighting organized crime which
remains largely unexplored.2 14 The federal govern-
ment did pass a special gambling tax in 1952295
However, the rates were far from the confiscatory
levels essential to the destruction of organized
gambling through tax alone. Although it seems
an extreme measure, it would probably not be
beyond the pale of constitutionality for a state
government to impose a special tax of 90% on all
revenues derived from the illegal businesses usually
engaged in by organized crime.299 Moreover, the
imposition of such a tax by a state government
would not necessitate repeal of criminal statutes
attaching criminal penalties to the conduct of
such businesses.2 r The difficulty, however, with
any such taxation measure is one of enforcement.
In order to establish criminal liability for failure
29- One writer, Russell Baker, carried on a one man
campaign-to gain recognition for this technique as a
means of destroying organized crime. See Baker, The
Federal Power and Organized Crime, 1953 WAsir. U. L.
Q. 121; Baker, Taxation: Potential Destroyer of Crime,
29 Cm-KENT L. Rlv. 197 (1951).
295 Under the federal law, two types of taxes are
imposed upon persons engaged in professional book-
making and numbers 'operations. First, a 10% excise
tax is collected on the gross amount of wagers placed
with the operation. The persons liable for this tax are
the principals, i.e., those with a proprietary interest in
the enterprise and who therefore ultimately "accept"
the wager from the bettor. See, 26 U.S.C. §4401-04. A
second "special occupational tax" of $50 per year as
imposed upon all persons liable for the excise tax and
all those who "receive wagers for and in behalf" of
such persons. See 26 U.S.C. §4411-13. It has been held
that this latter category embraces only those who
physically accept wagers from the betting public, not
the various "runners," bookkeepers, strong-arm men,
etc., who act as intermediaries between the betting
public and the principal operator and otherwise assist
in the conduct of the gambling enterprise. United
States v. Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351 (1957).
216The major constitutional question embedded in
such a statute would be whether it violated the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A
number of considerations supporting the reasonable-
ness of such a classification could probably be intro-
duced. Among them would be the difficulty of collecting
taxes from the criminal element, and more important
the negative contribution which this class makes to
society. See United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S.
287, 297 (1935) (dissent).
29 United States v. Stafoff, 260 U.S. 477 (1922).
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to pay the tax, the state would have to prove that
the money was derived from the operation of an
illegal business. And if such proof can be made, the
taxpayer can be imprisoned for violating the
criminal statutes prohibiting engaging in such
business. But as an interesting adjunct to other
techniques, one which in special situations might
prove useful, even decisive, in fighting organized
crime, confiscatory taxation aimed at destroying
organization profits merits serious consideration.
D. Evaluation of the Economic Sanction Approach
Because of the drama and illusion of final victory
which accompanies the successful prosecution of a
top figure in a criminal organization, this approach
has occupied the center stage of the effort against
organized- crime. Some of the reasons the convic-
tion of an organization leader seldom means the
end of an organization or even a dimunition of its
power were explored earlier.9 8 Often the more
feared and more effective, though admittedly less
dramatic, weapon is the approach which strikes
at the primary source of organization power-its
immense wealth.
The three techniques discussed in this section-
dosing of premises, confiscation of money and
property, and taxation of organization resources-
all have a similar purpose and effect, the infliction
of economic injury on the organization. The ad-
vantage of each of these techniques is that the
organization itself, or rather, -those persons who
own, control, and profit from its operations, must
suffer the effects. Unlike the arrest and fining or
imprisonment of lesser functionaries in an or-
ganization-a sanction scarcely felt by organiza-
tion leaders-, these techniques deprive the or-
ganization of assets and profits thereby imposing a
sanction on the beneficial owners of the criminal
organization.
In order for this approach to be effective, the
pressure against organization operations must be
maintained continuously over a long period of
time. The flow of profits must be dammed up for
an appreciable period before a criminal organiza-
tion will begin to experience a loss of power.
Through a sustained program of confiscation,
additional tax burdens, and dosing of organiza-
tion facilities, it should be possible to reduce
significantly the economic resources of an or-
ganization. Like any other business organiz tion
suffering a long series of economic setbacks, a
299 See pages 21-22, supra.
criminal organization will become a less important
force in the community. If the losses can be con-
tinued over a sufficient period of time, a criminal
organization, like any other business, will be forced
to cease operations. Profits are both the source
and the purpose of organization power. Without
them an organization cannot afford to carry on its
illegitimate activities. Moreover, with its assets
depleted an organization no longer will be able to
afford to pay public officials large bribes or to
support political organizations favorable to their
activities. And without the protective cloak of
corruption, an organization is likely to feel the full
brunt of local law enforcement. Therefore, the
demise of an organization may be accelerated in
its later stages, once the economic sanctions begin
taking effect.
The effectiveness of this approach will vary with
the characteristics of the illegal enterprise under
assault. If, like most forms of gambling, the enter-
prise must operate upon fixed premises, employ
relatively expensive equipment and paraphernalia,
and normally requires large quantities of money
to be retained on the premises, it is particularly
susceptible to permanent injury from this ap-
proach. Shylocking, on the other hand, which can
be carried on with a notepad and a strong arm, both
highly portable, can seldom be dealt a damaging
blow with these techniques. There simply are no
premises to close or valuable property to con-
fiscate. Ranged somewhere between these two
categories of illegal activity in their amenability
to this approach are the other primary sources
of organization income: narcotics, untaxed liquor,
and prostitution. The results which can be ex-
pected from the utilization of this approach against
a given criminal organization thus often may
depend upon what are its major enterprises. In
practice, there will be many organizations against
which this cannot be an ultimate weapon even if
perfectly and persistently implemented. On the
other hand, because of the importance of gambling
in the profit structure of most criminal organiza-
tions and the susceptibility of this activity to
this approach, there will be few which cannot be
severely wounded. Consequently, it is always a
useful, sometimes extremely potent weapon
against organized crime which appears to deserve
to occupy a significant place in any law enforce-
ment drive against a criminal organization.
However, one of the chief weaknesses of this
approach is political. Waging a lengthy campaign
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aimed at inflicting economic losses upon a criminal
organization will not yield the drama nor the
headlines nor create the political goodwill that
equal resources devoted to the "head-hunting"
of organization leaders can.
III. DENIAL OF SERVICES AND FACILITIES
ESSENTIAL TO THE OPERATION OF
ILLEGAL BUsiNEssEs
The third basic approach available to combat
organized crime is to sever the lines which supply
it with services and facilities essential to the
proper functioning of its illegal operations. Most
of the illegal businesses in which organized crime
participates depend upon the availability of certain
services and physical facilities. Most of these
services and facilities are readily replaceable
should the current source be cut off. However,
there is at least one notable exception: services
rendered by a monopoly and which cannot be
duplicated by the organization itself. Both of these
conditions are fulfilled in the field of rapid wire
communications.
A. Denial of Wire Services Necessary to Certain
Forms of Organized Gambling
Off-track betting, more than any other form of
illegal enterprise in which organized crime is in-
volved, requires rapid communication to function
successfully.2 9 For the transmission of the vital
race results from the racetrack to the distant
horse-room, the criminal organization depends on
wire communications. Wire communications, in
turn, are in the hands of a few highly regulated
monopolies. Through a series of criminal statutesns
and administrative procedures, a number of states
have sought to shut off this supply of vital informa-
tion by denying use of these public facilities to
criminal organizations. To the extent that these
states have been successful in shutting off this
20 "Communications dominate the activity of the
modem bookmaker. The national race wire ,service
... is essential to any large-scale bookmaking opera-
tion. Similarly, the telephone is the bookmaker's
chief medium in accepting bets, laying off bets, etc."
ABA REPORT, op: cit. supra note 213, at 84.
300 See MICH. STAT. ANN. §28.537; which makes it
illegal for any person to distribute information concern-
ing wagering odds, etc., to the public. Pennsylvania,
PA. STATS. ANN. (Purdon) tit. 66, §1702-10, and
Florida, FLA. STATS. ANN., §365.01-365.14, have
statutes aimed at the public utility furnishing the
communications service. These statutes prohibit such
utilities from knowingly furnishing private wires for
dissemination of racing information.
necessary flow of information, they have closed
down or seriously curtailed off-track betting.
Most state criminal statutes dealing with the
dissemination of race results proscribe the trans-
mission of such information with intent that it be
used in a gambling operation.n 1 This imposes a
difficult problem of proof upon the prosecutive
agency, because of the necessity of establishing that
the sender knew of the recipient's intended use of
the information received. Florida has solved this
evidentiary problem by banning all dissemination
of racing information for a period of thirty minutes
subsequent to each race.30 A useful adjunct to
criminal sanctions is the provision which a few
states have made for the severing of communica-
tions services to persons or establishments which
are shown to be' utilizing such service in further-
ance of commercial gambling activities. Some of
these statutes authorize public utilities to curtail
service to any establishment identified by a law
enforcement agency as a facility used for gambling
purposesn03
This state legislation has not been wholly effec-
tive, however, because much of the communica-
tions involved are interstate and not susceptible
to state jurisdiction. There are even instances of
clever criminal organizations converting what
would ordinarily be an intrastate network into
interstate communications by having the informa-
tion relayed from one state to another and then
back to the original state, thus nullifying any
attempts by the state government to prevent the
transmissions. The obvious solution to this prob-
lem is federal legislation prohibiting the transmis-
sion of such information in interstate commerce.
Such legislation was first proposed in 1953 by the
301 For discussion of the results of these campaigns
as well as the various legal devices adopted to close off
the illegal customers from their essential communica-
tion network, see notes in 39 CALIF. L. REv. 145 (1951);
40 J. Cmnf. L., C. & P. S. 176 (1952); 17 Mo. L. REv.
16 (1952); 40 GEO. L. J. 68 (1951); 35 MImN. L. REv.
262 (1951).
W2 FL. STAT. ANN. §396.09.
W3 See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon) tit. 66, §1702-
10. Without a specific statute the California Public
Utilities Commission in 1948 interpreted its duties as
encompassing the power to order the cessation of wire
services to subscribers identified by law enforcement
officers as gambling enterprises. Decision No. 41415,
47 P.U.C. 853 (1948). See also McBride v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 171 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1949), in
which it was held that a gambler was not entitled to
resumption of service discontinued by the Western




Kefauver Committee.3 4 In 1961, a statute finally
was enacted which renders the interstate transmis-
sion of wagering information a federal crime."'
This statute also provides that upon notification
by federal authorities that a communication sub-
scriber is sending gambling information, a public
utility is to disconnect the subscriber's service.3 6
Although rapid communications are obviously
indispensable to off-track betting, they are also of
crucial importance to other operations of the
criminal organization.37 As with any large far-
flung business concern, organized crime relies to a
large extent up6n the availability of a fast, reliable
means of transmitting messages, whether the
message relates to future plans, the current level of
business, the arrival of new customers, or warning
of an impending police raid. Legislation cutting
off all organization enterprises and members from
all forms of public communications could probably
be profitably considered by all governments,
federal, state and local.
B. Denial of Physical Facilities Necessary to Certain
Organization Entcrprises
The dosing down of gambling houses and houses
of prostitution was discussed as one of the means
of inflicting economic loss on organization enter-
prises00S In that context, the costs which the
104 S. 1624, 82d Congress. See summary and critique
of this proposed bill in ABA REPORT, op. cit. supra
note 213, at 47.
5 18 U.S.C. §1084.
106 "When any common carrier, subject to the juris-
diction of the Federal Communications Commission, is
notified in writing by a Federal, state, or local law
enforcement agency, acting within its jurisdiction, that
any facility furnished by it is being used or will be used
for the purpose of transmitting or receiving gambling
information in interstate or foreign commerce in viola-
tion of Federal, state or local law, it shall discontinue
or refuse, the leasing, furnishing, or maintaining of
such facility, after reasonable notice to the subscriber,
but no damages, penalty or forfeiture, civil or criminal,
shall be found against any common carrier for any act
done in compliance with any notice received from a
law enforcement agency. Nothing in this section shall
be deemed to prejudice the right of any person affected
thereby to secure an appropriate determination, as
otherwise provided by law, in a Federal court or in a
state or local tribunal or agency, that such facility
should not be discontinued or removed, or should be
restored." 18 U.S.C. §1084(d).
3 An example of another type of enterprise de-
pendent upon the availability of rapid communica-
tions is provided by the call girl racket. Recently, the
Chicago Police Department has endeavored to secure
the cessation of phone service to Chicago's largest
escort service, contending that the "escort" service
was actually a front for a call girl service.
35 See pages 24-25, supra.
dosing of such facilities entail were emphasized.
But such action by the state has another effect in
addition to financial loss. It deprives the organiza-
tion of necessary facilities, at least temporarily.
If the state government were vigorously to employ
the tactics of liquor license revocation and public
nuisance injunctions against premises upon which
illegal organization businesses were conducted, the
supply of such facilities available to the criminal
organization would rapidly shrink and possibly
virtually disappear. The organization would be
hesitant to purchase such premises out-right,
realizing that they might be dosed shortly and
rendered virtually worthless, especially for or-
ganization purposes. And landlords would be
equally leery of renting their buildings to persons
they suspect of illegal designs, and also quick to
evict upon learning that their premises were being
used for an illegal enterprise.
C. Evaluation of Denial of Services and Facilities
As was true of the approach of causing economic
loss to organized crime, this approach has applica-
tion only to those enterprises of the organization
which are illegal in themselves. Facilities cannot be
denied a legitimate business merely because it is
using illegal methods of competition. Two condi-
tions must be met before the denial of essential
facilities can be a truly conclusive weapon. First,
the illegal business must depend upon one or more
services or other facilities in order to function
properly. Second, the government must be able to
sever all sources of supply of that service or facility.
Both of these conditions can be substantially ful-
filled in the case of off-track betting and its es-
sential service-racing information. Most other
types of illegal businesses operated by organized
crime do not appear to yield so readily to this
technique. But the approach is not devoid of other
useful applications. 9 It certainly is worth retain-
ing in the arsenal as a secondary weapon.
IV. SUMMARY
In this installment the author has attempted to
survey the primary weapons available to an honest,
101 Other facilities, services, or products which are
essential to various illegal businesses and the curtail-
ment of which would at least impede organized crime,
include slot machines and other complex, not easily
constructed, gambling devices; automatic weapons;
phone service to any gambling premises or call girl
headquarters; electricity, gas, running water, and other
utilities to premises, such as elaborate gambling
casinos or bootleg breweries, which depend upon these
utilities in the conduct of ordinary operations.
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dedicated prosecutor and his associates in the
struggle to contain organized crime, the police,
other investigative bodies, and the legislature.
None of the three basic approaches discussed is an
ultimate weapon. However, a coordinated attack
on all three fronts over a sustained period could
bring the end of a criminal organization as an im-
portant force in the community and eventually
lead to its dissolution. Any criminal organization
would be hard pressed to survive the imprisonment
of significant numbers of its managerial personnel;
the financial losses associated with confiscation
of its property, closing of its premises, and onerous
taxation; and the denial of those critical services
and facilities which are indispensible to its opera-
tions. However, seldom if ever has such a campaign
been mounted against organized crime in any sec-
tion of the nation. In some states, this is because
the legislature has not provided local prosecutors
with the full panoply of legal weapons and financial
resources necessary to such a campaign. In other
states and at other times it is because the
prosecutor has chosen to allow his weapons to
rust and to channel the resources into other less
critical tasks. At this stage corruption in the legis-
lature, the prosecutor's office, the police force,
and the judiciary assumes importance. Corruption
prevents the enactment of necessary legislation
and the effective utilization of such legislation
against organized crime; while it is allowed to
paralyze the law enforcement effort against or-
ganized crime, the weapons and techniques dis-
cussed in this installment will be of no avail.
Accordingly, the third and final installment of this
article will consider the legal antidotes to
corruption.
